Investing

Fed Policy and Inflation Forecasts

Posted by Peter on February 25, 2016
Posted in: Economics, Investing, U.S. Politics. Tagged: , , , .

NGDP targeting has been gaining popularity recently. But targeting market-based inflation forecasts will be about as good under most conditions [1], and we have good markets that forecast the U.S. inflation rate [2].

Those forecasts have a track record that starts in 2003. The track record seems quite consistent with my impressions about when the Fed should have adopted a more inflationary policy (to promote growth and to get inflation expectations up to 2% [3]) and when it should have adopted a less inflationary policy (to avoid fueling the housing bubble). It’s probably a bit controversial to say that the Fed should have had a less inflationary policy from February through July or August of 2008. But my impression (from reading the stock market) is that NGDP futures would have said roughly the same thing. The inflation forecasts sent a clear signal starting in very early September 2008 that Fed policy was too tight, and that’s about when other forms of hindsight switch from muddled to saying clearly that Fed policy was dangerously tight.

Why do I mention this now? The inflation forecast dropped below 1 percent two weeks ago for the first time since May 2008. So the Fed’s stated policies conflict with what a more reputable source of information says the Fed will accomplish. This looks like what we’d see if the Fed was in the process of causing a mild recession to prevent an imaginary increase in inflation.

What does the Fed think it’s doing?

  • It might be relying on interest rates to estimate what it’s policies will produce. Interest rates this low after 6.5 years of economic expansion resemble historical examples of loose monetary policy more than they resemble the stereotype of tight monetary policy [4].
  • The Fed could be following a version of the Taylor Rule. Given standard guesses about the output gap and equilibrium real interest rate [5], the Taylor Rule says interest rates ought to be rising now. The Taylor Rule has usually been at least as good as actual Fed policy at targeting inflation indirectly through targeting interest rates. But that doesn’t explain why the Fed targets interest rates when that conflicts with targeting market forecasts of inflation.
  • The Fed could be influenced by status quo bias: interest rates and unemployment are familiar types of evidence to use, whereas unbiased inflation forecasts are slightly novel.
  • Could the Fed be reacting to money supply growth? Not in any obvious way: the monetary base stopped growing about two years ago, M1 and MZM growth are slowing slightly, and M2 accelerated recently (but only after much of the Fed’s tightening).

Scott Sumner’s rants against reasoning from interest rates explain why the Fed ought to be embarrassed to use interest rates to figure out whether Fed policy is loose or tight.

Yet some institutional incentives encourage the Fed to target interest rates rather than predicted inflation. It feels like an appropriate use of high-status labor to set interest rates once every few weeks based on new discussion of expert wisdom. Switching to more or less mechanical responses to routine bond price changes would undercut much of the reason for believing that the Fed’s leaders are doing high-status work.

The news media storytellers would have trouble finding entertaining ways of reporting adjustments that consisted of small hourly responses to bond market changes. Whereas decisions made a few times per year are uncommon enough to be genuinely newsworthy. And meetings where hawks struggle against doves fit our instinctive stereotype for important news better than following a rule does. So I see little hope that storytellers will want to abandon their focus on interest rates. Do the Fed governors follow the storytellers closely enough that the storytellers’ attention strongly affects the Fed’s attention? Would we be better off if we could ban the Fed from seeing any source of daily stories?

Do any other interest groups prefer stable interest rates over stable inflation rates? I expect a wide range of preferences among Wall Street firms, but I’m unaware which preferences are dominant there.

Consumers presumably prefer that their banks, credit cards, etc have predictable interest rates. But I’m skeptical that the Fed feels much pressure to satisfy those preferences.

We need to fight those pressures by laughing at people who claim that the Fed is easing when markets predict below-target inflation (as in the fall of 2008) or that the Fed is tightening when markets predict above-target inflation (e.g. much of 2004).

P.S. – The risk-reward ratio for the stock market today is much worse than normal. I’m not as bearish as I was in October 2008, but I’ve positioned myself much more cautiously than normal.

Notes:

[1] – They appear to produce nearly identical advice under most conditions that the U.S. has experienced recently.

I expect inflation targeting to be modestly safer than NGDP targeting. I may get around to explaining my reasons for that in a separate post.

[2] – The link above gives daily forecasts of the 5 year CPI inflation rate. See here for some longer time periods.

The markets used to calculate these forecasts have enough liquidity that it would be hard for critics to claim that they could be manipulated by entities less powerful than the Fed. I expect some critics to claim that anyway.

[3] – I’m accepting the standard assumption that 2% inflation is desirable, in order to keep this post simple. Figuring out the optimal inflation rate is too hard for me to tackle any time soon. A predictable inflation rate is clearly desirable, which creates some benefits to following a standard that many experts agree on.

[4] – providing that you don’t pay much attention to Japan since 1990.

[5] – guesses which are error-prone and, if a more direct way of targeting inflation is feasible, unnecessary. The conflict between the markets’ inflation forecast and the Taylor Rule’s implication that near-zero interest rates would cause inflation to rise suggests that we should doubt those guesses. I’m pretty sure that equilibrium interest rates are lower than the standard assumptions. I don’t know what to believe about the output gap.

Upside-Down Index Investing Strategies

Posted by Peter on September 24, 2015
Posted in: Investing. Tagged: .

I was quite surprised by a paper (The Surprising Alpha From Malkiel’s Monkey and Upside-Down Strategies [PDF] by Robert D. Arnott, Jason Hsu, Vitali Kalesnik, and Phil Tindall) about “inverted” or upside-down[*] versions of some good-looking strategies for better-than-market-cap weighting of index funds.

They show that the inverse of low volatility and fundamental weighting strategies do about as well as or outperform the original strategies. Low volatility index funds still have better Sharpe ratios (risk-adjusted returns) than their inverses.

Their explanation is that most deviations from weighting by market capitalization will benefit from the size effect (small caps outperform large caps), and will also have some tendency to benefit from value effects. Weighting by market capitalization causes an index to have lots of Exxon and Apple stock. Fundamental weighting replaces some of that Apple stock with small companies. Weighting by anything that has little connection to company size (such as volatility) reduces the Exxon and Apple holdings by more than an order of magnitude. Both of those shifts exploit the benefits of investing in small-cap stocks.

Fundamental weighting outperforms most strategies. But inverting those weights adds slightly more than 1% per year to those already good returns. The only way that makes sense to me is if an inverse of market-cap weighting would also outperform fundamental weighting, by investing mostly in the smallest stocks.

They also show you can beat market-capitalization weighted indices by choosing stocks at random (i.e. simulating monkeys throwing darts at the list of companies). This highlights the perversity of weighting by market-caps, as the monkeys can’t beat the simple alternative of investing equal dollar amounts in each company.

This increases my respect for the size effect. I’ve reduced my respect for the benefits of low volatility investments, although the reduced risk they produce is still worth something. That hasn’t much changed my advice for investing in existing etf’s, but it does alter what I hope for in etf’s that will become available in the future.

[*] – They examine two different inverses:

  1. Taking the reciprocal of each stock’s original weight
  2. Taking the max(weight) and subtracting each stock’s original weight

In each case the resulting weights are then normalized to add to 1.

Charity for Corporations

Posted by Peter on April 12, 2013
Posted in: Investing. Tagged: .

In his talk last week, Robin Hanson mentioned an apparently suboptimal level of charitable donations to for-profit companies.

My impression is that some of the money raised on Kickstarter and Indiegogo is motivated by charity.

Venture capitalists occasionally bias their investments towards more “worthy” causes.

I wonder whether there’s also some charitable component to people accepting lower salaries in order to work at jobs that sound like they produce positive externalities.

Charity for profitable companies isn’t likely to become a popular concept anytime soon, but that doesn’t keep subsets of it from becoming acceptable if framed differently.

CFTC Sues Intrade

Posted by Peter on November 26, 2012
Posted in: Idea Futures, Investing, U.S. Politics.

The CFTC is suing Intrade for apparently allowing U.S. residents to trade contracts on gold, unemployment rates and a few others that it had agreed to prevent U.S. residents from trading. The CFTC is apparently not commenting on whether Intrade’s political contracts violate any laws.

U.S. traders will need to close our accounts.

The email I got says

In the near future we’ll announce plans for a new exchange model that will allow legal participation from all jurisdictions – including the US.

(no statement about whether it will involve real money, which suggests that it won’t).

I had already been considering closing my account because of the hassle of figuring out my Intrade income for tax purposes.

The Signal and the Noise

Posted by Peter on October 29, 2012
Posted in: Book Reviews, Idea Futures, Investing, U.S. Politics. Tagged: , , .

Book review: The Signal and the Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail-but Some Don’t by Nate Silver.

This is a well-written book about the challenges associated with making predictions. But nearly all the ideas in it were ones I was already familiar with.

I agree with nearly everything the book says. But I’ll mention two small disagreements.

He claims that 0 and 100 percent are probabilities. Many Bayesians dispute that. He has a logically consistent interpretation and doesn’t claim it’s ever sane to believe something with probability 0 or 100 percent, so I’m not sure the difference matters, but rejecting the idea that those can represent probabilities seems at least like a simpler way of avoiding mistakes.

When pointing out the weak correlation between calorie consumption and obesity, he says he doesn’t know of an “obesity skeptics” community that would be comparable to the global warming skeptics. In fact there are people (e.g. Dave Asprey) who deny that excess calories cause obesity (with better tests than the global warming skeptics).

It would make sense to read this book instead of alternatives such as Moneyball and Tetlock’s Expert Political Judgment, but if you’ve been reading books in this area already this one won’t seem important.

Manias, Panics and Crashes

Posted by Peter on February 12, 2012
Posted in: Book Reviews, Investing, Politics. Tagged: , .

Book review: Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises 6th ed., by Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Aliber.

The book starts with a good overview of how a typical bubble develops and bursts. But I found the rest of the book poorly organized. I often wondered whether the book was reporting a particular historical fact as an example of some broad pattern – if not, why weren’t they organized in something closer to chronological order? It has lots of information that is potentially valuable, but not organized into a useful story or set of references.

Thinking, Fast and Slow

Posted by Peter on January 15, 2012
Posted in: Book Reviews, Investing, The Human Mind. Tagged: , , .

Book review: Thinking, Fast and Slow, by Daniel Kahneman.

This book is an excellent introduction to the heuristics and biases literature, but only small parts of it will seem new to those who are familiar with the subject.

While the book mostly focuses on conditions where slow, logical thinking can do better than fast, intuitive thinking, I find it impressive that he was careful to consider the views of those who advocate intuitive thinking, and that he collaborated with a leading advocate of intuition to resolve many of their apparent disagreements (mainly by clarifying when each kind of thinking is likely to work well).

His style shows that he has applied some of the lessons of the research in his field to his own writing, such as by giving clear examples. (“Subjects’ unwillingness to deduce the particular from the general was matched only by their willingness to infer the general from the particular”).

He sounds mildly overconfident (and believes mild overconfidence can be ok), but occasionally provides examples of his own irrationality.

He has good advice for investors (e.g. reduce loss aversion via “broad framing” – think of a single loss as part of a large class of results that are on average profitable), and appropriate disdain for investment advisers. But he goes overboard when he treats the stock market as unpredictable. The stock market has some real regularities that could be exploited. Most investors fail to find them because they see many more regularities than are real, are overconfident about their ability to distinguish the real ones, and because it’s hard to distinguish valuable feedback (which often takes many years to get) from misleading feedback.

I wish I could find equally good book for overuse of logical analysis when I want the speed of intuition (e.g. “analysis paralysis”).

Bitcoin

Posted by Peter on October 28, 2011
Posted in: Investing. Tagged: .

In the process of researching Bitcoin to help me decide whether to buy some as an investment, I’ve come across some confusion about money in some prominent articles.
This article says:

the demand for Bitcoins is driven by the volume of Bitcoin-denominated transactions.

…

the value of a currency is built on its reputation, and five months of bad news and depreciation have done serious damage.

Money serves several different functions. To be widely accepted, a currency typically needs to serve as a medium of exchange and as a store of value. But gold is a good example of a quasi-currency that functions as a fairly good store of value (at least for people with long time horizons). Bitcoin shows more promise of functioning as a store of value than as a medium of exchange.

If Bitcoin were only a medium of exchange, it might make sense to say the volume of Bitcoin transactions drives the demand for it. But if most people who are buying Bitcoins are hiding them under their mattresses on EMP-resistant media (cd-rom?), the price of Bitcoins can rise indefinitely without an increase in transactions.

It isn’t very useful to lump many beliefs about a currency into a single reputation. Bitcoin has different reputations for different traits.

A currency should have a reputation for being in limited supply and for not having that supply increase too rapidly. I’d say Bitcoin has developed a better reputation for this than the US dollar, and might exceed gold’s reputation.

A currency should be easy to store and transport safely. This is an area where Bitcoin’s reputation is the subject of much confusion. There’s currently an unpleasant tradeoff between secure ways to store Bitcoin and convenient ways to have them available to spend. It make take a major rewrite of operating systems (e.g. to use Capability-based security with a good UI) for it to be possible to have Bitcoins be conveniently accessible but hard to steal. Confusion over the risk of theft has probably driven a fair amount of the recent Bitcoin price volatility. My guess is that it’s better that theft has happened now than after people become more reliant on Bitcoin. It will either drive the creation of more secure software (with benefits much wider than Bitcoin use) or discourage people from relying on insecure ways of handling digital money.

Finally, it’s important that a currency have a reputation for being something that people will value in the future. This is a source of significant uncertainty, because it depends on people’s perceptions of the alternative stores of value, the alternative media of exchange, and the risk of Bitcoin theft. Bitcoin has the potential to be a better store of value than gold, because a transparent algorithm can better guarantee a limited supply than the difficulty of mining a metal. People who started watching Bitcoin prices a few months ago in response to a flurry of publicity attach a low reputation to its prospects as a store of value because the recent price crash is more vivid in their mind than the earlier boom, but that’s a temporary phenomenon that doesn’t deserve much attention.

For most uses as a medium of exchange, Bitcoin doesn’t offer much advantage now. For most transactions, the small cost savings aren’t enough to persuade consumers to give up the ability to dispute a payment, or for stores that accept Bitcoin with an option to dispute payment to offer a discount for Bitcoin purchases. And I expect governments and large financial institutions to create obstacles to its use as a medium of exchange. There are a few small uses where it works better than any existing alternative – e.g. Wikileaks, where the existing financial system refuses to support online payments. Bitcoin anonymity doesn’t appear strong enough to attract people engaged in illegal businesses. Online gambling companies might get some advantage from using Bitcoin if the obstacles to transferring money to gambling sites exceed the obstacles to buying Bitcoin, but I’m guessing the obstacles are and will be at least as large for buying Bitcoin. So I expect very slow adoption of Bitcoin as a medium of exchange.

I do think there’s a nontrivial chance that Bitcoin will become widely used as a store of value, and that might replace a significant amount of demand for gold a decade or two from now. A decline in demand for gold as a store of value might well snowball, as extrapolating that trend would imply that gold becomes a less reliable store of value. That doesn’t yet make me reluctant to buy gold, but a Bitcoin price over 0.1 ounces of gold might make me reconsider.

I will probably invest a small fraction of my net worth in Bitcoin, but I don’t feel any urgency about it.

Expected Returns

Posted by Peter on August 23, 2011
Posted in: Book Reviews, Investing. Tagged: , .

Book review: Expected Returns: An Investor’s Guide to Harvesting Market Rewards, by Antti Ilmanen.
This book is causing me to change my approach to investing much more than any other book has. It is essential reading for any professional investor.

The foreword starts by describing Ilmanen as insane, and that sounds like a good description of how much effort was needed to write it.

Amateur investors will have trouble understanding it – if you’re not familiar with Sharpe ratios, you should expect to spend a lot of time looking elsewhere for descriptions of many concepts that the book uses. I had a few problems understanding the book – he uses the term information ratio on page 188, but doesn’t explain it until page 491 (and it’s not indexed). I was also somewhat suspicious about how he handled data mining (overfitting) concerns in momentum strategies until I found a decent answer in a non-obvious place (page 404).

The most important benefit of this book is that he has put a lot of thought into identifying which questions investors should be trying to answer. Questions such as whether past performance is a good indicator of future returns, and what would cause a pattern of superior returns to persist or vanish.

Some other interesting topics:

  • why it’s important to distinguish between different types of undiversifiable risk, and how to diversify your strategies so that the timing of losses aren’t highly correlated across those strategies.
  • why earnings per share growth has been and probably will continue to be below GDP growth, contrary to what most forecasts suggest.
  • how to estimate the premium associated with illiquidity
  • why it’s useful to look at changes in correlations between equities

It’s really strange that I ordered this a few weeks after what Amazon lists as the publication date, but it took them nearly 7 weeks to find a copy of it.

Some quotes:

overfitting bias is so insidious that we cannot eliminate it (we cannot “become virgins again” and forget our knowledge)

the leverage of banks will soon be more tightly restricted by new regulations. The practical impact will be more pronounced risk premia for low-volatility assets, more sustained mispricings, and greater opportunities for those who can still apply leverage