I said in my review of WEIRDest People that the Flynn effect seems like a natural consequence of thinking styles that became more analytical, abstract, reductionist, and numerical.

I’ll expand here on some questions which I swept under the rug, so that I could keep that review focused on the book’s most important aspects.

Cultural Bias

After reading WEIRDest People, I find that the goal of a culture-neutral IQ test looks strange (and, of course, WEIRD). At least as strange as trying to fix basketball to stop favoring tall people.

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Book review: The WEIRDest People in the World, by Joseph Henrich.

Wow!

Henrich previously wrote one of the best books of the last decade. Normally, I expect such an author’s future books to, at best, exhibit regression toward the mean. But Henrich’s grand overview of humanity’s first few million years was merely a modest portion of the ideas that he originally tried to fit into this magnum opus. Henrich couldn’t quite explain in one volume how humanity got all the way to industrial empires, so he split the explanation into two books.

The cartoon version of the industrial revolution: Protestant culture made the West more autistic.

However, explaining the most important event in history makes up only about 25% of this book’s focus and value.

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Book review: The Precipice, by Toby Ord.

No, this isn’t about elections. This is about risks of much bigger disasters. It includes the risks of pandemics, but not the kind that are as survivable as COVID-19.

The ideas in this book have mostly been covered before, e.g. in Global Catastrophic Risks (Bostrom and Cirkovic, editors). Ord packages the ideas in a more organized and readable form than prior discussions.

See the Slate Star Codex review of The Precipice for an eloquent summary of the book’s main ideas.

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From The problem with rapid Covid testing, Mayank Gupta writes:

The absolute number of false positives would rise dramatically under slightly inaccurate, broad surveillance testing. At least initially, the number of people going to the doctor to ask what to do would also rise. One can imagine if doctors truly flubbed and didn’t know how to advise patients accurately, a lot of individual patients would lose trust in the medical system (testing, doctors, or both). The consequence of this would be more resistance to health public policy measures in the future.

For a reminder of why rapid testing is valuable, see Alex Tabarrok. Note also the evidence from the NBA that people who need useful tests can be more innovative than the medical system.

This seems like the tip of an important iceberg.

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Lots of people want to frame the 2020 US election as a fight between the left and the right, with the wrong side being near an extreme on that spectrum. They are deceiving you.

The U.S. is facing some extremism, but it has little connection to the extremes of the left-right spectrum [1]. The latest dangers are extreme mainly on a very different spectrum. A spectrum on which Trump and the woke are very similar.

How to describe this spectrum? I’m unsure what the best description is, so I’ll list some that capture important components of it:

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I tried to finish this in time for April 1, 2019, but masterpieces take time, and I didn’t find the time to turn this into a masterpiece. Then I kept adding sections that didn’t fit with the April Fools spirit, for a result that, like South Park, is not suitable for any audience. Finally, an economic crisis prompted me to publish whatever incomplete version of it I could manage to write, before people notice that we’ve avoided a depression. I’m definitely not satisfied with the quality of this post, but can’t afford to put more time into it.

In this post, I’ll try to summarize my guesses as to what are the most controversial parts of Scott Sumner’s monetary policy ideas.

In the process, I’ll try to dress them up to look more like the kind of wisdom that requires years of study to master. After all, I wouldn’t want anyone to get the impression that the Fed’s highly educated experts could be replaced by, say, ordinary bloggers.

In particular, I will attempt to correct the serious shortage of equations and graphs that plagues market monetarist writings.

I’ve attempted to make this fancy enough to belong in a prestigious publication, but I’m little more than an ordinary blogger, and I doubt that I’ve been thorough enough, or have enough experience at creating a prestigious style. Please feel free to write a more sophisticated-looking version of this post, and borrow as much as you like, without any need to credit me.

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A new study has provided evidence that a healthy lifestyle can reverse aging, as measured by epigenetic age: Reversal of Epigenetic Age with Diet and Lifestyle in a Pilot Randomized Clinical Trial. This is the second study to show that epigenetic age can be reversed in humans (here’s a reminder to read the first).

They used the Horvath DNAmAge clock.

After a mere 8 weeks of a healthy lifestyle, the subjects’ DNAmAge was 3.23 years younger than the controls (and 1.96 years younger than the pre-trial DNAmAge of the treatment group).

The lifestyle interventions weren’t labeled as paleo, but they closely resemble the lifestyles that are recommended by Chris Kresser, Steven R. Gundry, and Dale Bredesen. The diet comes about as close as the diet of a typical paleo enthusiast to avoiding foods that have been available for less than 10,000 years. The recommended foods that I consider the least paleo are “coconut, olive, flaxseed and pumpkin seed oil”. The diet is more plant-based than the stereotypical paleo diet, but it’s well within the normal range of hunter-gatherer diets.

The study has a bunch of the usual limitations, such as a small sample size (18 people in the treatment group). There are also reasons for mild concerns about conflicts of interest, as some of the researchers work as functional medicine physicians, so their careers are mildly dependent on the popularity of the lifestyle approach being studied. As far as I can tell, that is likely to cause a level of bias that is rather ordinary for nutrition-related research. Oh, and the instructions are listed as “Patent pending”, but it’s unclear why they would meet the novelty requirements for a patent.

My main doubt comes from the difficulty of figuring out whether DNAmAge measures causes of age-related health problems, or whether it’s just measuring symptoms. I’m slightly more than 50% confident that epigenetic changes have some causal influence on aging.

This kind of trial raises questions about how well patients follow the instructions – most would find it difficult to “Avoid added sugar/candy, dairy, grains, legumes/beans”. The paper describes how they checked on patient compliance, but I didn’t see any data indicating what they found about compliance. So there’s some risk that they were especially lucky about getting patients to follow their instructions, and maybe future studies of this nature will show much weaker results due to poor compliance.

Lastly, it’s a bit odd that the control group appeared to age 1.27 years in 8 weeks. Maybe they were depressed about not getting any treatment? (This isn’t the kind of study where blinding is feasible). More likely it was just noise, but that’s a reminder that the small sample size provides lots of opportunity for luck to dominate the results. Even if we assume perfect measurement, there’s plenty of room for variation in lifestyles. Uncontrolled lifestyle changes, such as someone getting fired, could mess with the results enough to matter.

Lots of people have been asking recently why the stock market appears unconnected with the economy.

There are several factors that contribute to that impression.

First, stock market indexes are imperfect measures of the whole stock market. Well-known indexes such as the S&P500 are higher than pre-pandemic, but the average stock is down something like 10% over the same time period. The difference is due to some well-known stocks such as Apple and Amazon, which have unusually large weights in the S&P500.

See this Colby Davis post for some relevant charts, and for some good arguments against buying large growth stocks today.

Stock markets react to the foreseeable future, whereas the daily news, and most politicians, prefer to focus attention on the recent past. People who focus on the recent past see a US that’s barely able to decide whether to fight COVID-19, whereas the market sees vaccines and/or good treatments enabling business to return to normal within a year.

Stock markets don’t try to reflect the costs associated with death, chronic fatigue, domestic violence, etc. Too many people want the market to be either a perfect indicator of how well we’re doing, or to dismiss it as worthless. Sorry, but imperfect indicators are all we have.

Plenty of influential people have been exaggerating the harm caused by the pandemic, in order to manipulate the average person into taking the pandemic seriously. As far as I can tell, this backfired, and contributed to the anti-mask backlash. It also contributed to stocks being underpriced in the spring, so parts of the stock market rebound have simply been reactions to the growing evidence that most large companies are recovering.

The vaccine news has been persistently good, except for the opposition from big pharma and their friends at the FDA to making vaccines available as soon as possible.

Another modest factor is that many companies dramatically reduced their capital expenditure plans starting around March and April. That will reduce production capacities for the next year or two, thus making shortages of goods a bit more common than usual. This should prop up profit margins. But I haven’t noticed much connection between the most relevant industries and rising stock prices.

Why is there such a large divergence between the S&P500 and the average stock?

Investors have developed a somewhat unusual degree of preference for well-known companies whose long-term growth prospects seem safe.

I guessed last year that this would be a rerun of the Nifty Fifty. I still see important similarities in investor attitudes, but I see enough divergences in patterns of stock prices that I’m guessing we’ll get something in between the broad, gradual peak of the Nifty Fifty and a standard bubble (i.e. with a well-defined peak followed by a clear reversal within months).

Remember that high volatility is somewhat correlated with being in a bubble. We’ve recently seen Zoom Video Communications rise 40% in one day, and Salesforce rise 26%, in response to good earnings reports. That’s a $50 billion one-day gain for Salesforce. It reminds me of the volatility in PetroChina in 2007 (PetroChina has declined 87% since then). There was also that $173 billion rise in Apple after it’s latest earnings report, but that was a mere 10.5% rise.

Some of the divergence is due to small retailers losing business to Amazon, and to small restaurant chains losing business to fast food chains.

The bubble is a bit broader than just tech stocks – Home Depot and Chipotle are well above their pre-pandemic levels, by much larger amounts than can be explained by any near-term changes in their profits.

Incumbent politicians have been trying to buy votes by shoveling money to influential companies and people. There’s been some speculation that that’s biased toward large companies. It seems likely that large companies are better able to take advantage of those deals, because they’re more likely to employ someone with expertise at dealing with the government than is, say, a barbershop.

But I don’t see how that explains more than 1% of the stock market divergence. Stocks like Apple and Tesla have risen much more than can be explained by any change in this year’s profits. Any sane explanation of those soaring stocks has to involve increased optimism about profits that they’ll be making 5 to 10 years from now.

Large companies have better access to banks. Large companies typically have someone who is an expert at dealing with banks, and they have the accounting competence to make it easy for banks to figure out how much they can safely lend to the company. In contrast, a family-owned business will be slower to figure out how to borrow money, and therefore is more likely to go out of business due to unusual problems such as a pandemic. That might explain a fair amount of the divergence between the S&P500 and what you hear by word of mouth, but it explains little of the divergence between the S&P500 and the publicly traded companies that are too small for the S&P500.

I’ve only done a little selling recently, and I’ve been mostly avoiding large companies for many years. I’m guessing that Thursday’s tech stock crash wasn’t the end of the bubble. Bubbles tend to continue expanding until the average investor gets tired of hearing pundits say that we’re in a bubble. That suggests the peak is at least a month away, and I could imagine it being more than a year away.

I’ve been brainstorming about what might happen with this year’s election. Here’s one of the more interesting (but not likely) scenarios that I’ve imagined:

Most parts of the US are experiencing their second or third wave of the pandemic. Two of the more heavily funded vaccine trials have just been declared to be failures. No US or European company expects to have a vaccine ready for FDA approval before December. Prediction markets say Trump’s chances of re-election have dropped to 20%.

China announces on October 27 that Sinopharm Group has a COVID-19 vaccine that meets China’s safety and effectiveness standards, and can deliver about 1 million doses by November 2.

China offers to allocate half of this initial batch of vaccines to the US, on the grounds that the US is a relatively needy country, and Donald Trump is currently a close friend of China.

Why, I hear you wonder, would China treat Trump as a friend?

China is strong enough that the government can afford to tolerate Trump’s annoying trade wars, and they maybe even see some benefit from reducing China’s somewhat excessive dependence on the US. It’s important to keep in mind that democracy is one of the larger threats to the Beijing regime (h/t scholars-stage). 2020 has proven to be a good year to mount a campaign to demonstrate that socialism with Chinese characteristics is superior to US-style democracy. I’ll leave as an exercise for my readers to figure out how many ways the idea of democracy could be discredited by a Trump re-election.

Why would a Chinese company be faster than US/European companies at producing a vaccine? My initial guess was differences in regulatory red tape would favor China, but my attempt to find evidence for such a pattern turned up nothing. My current guess is that differences between countries in who volunteers for a vaccine trial will have important effects on how quickly the control groups get infected. Trials in some countries may attract only people who are sufficiently risk-averse that the control groups are slower than expected at getting infected. Please don’t assume that I have any useful expertise here; I’m mostly just guessing.

I also wondered whether willingness to do human challenge trials would determine who verifies their vaccine first. I have vague intuitions that China is more likely than other countries to try that, but I haven’t found evidence to confirm those intuitions.

How would voters react to this scenario? My best guess is that the election would be surprisingly close, but Trump would still lose.

The stock market would rise due to the vaccine benefits. There would be no good way to infer the market’s opinion about the election until the results are announced. I’m still confused as to how this scenario should affect my investment strategies.

P.S. – China and Sinopharm aren’t willing to predict when they’ll able to submit the forms needed for FDA approval, and ask that the US consider the approval of China’s NMPA to be good enough evidence of the vaccine’s safety and effectiveness. How does the FDA react?