Book review: Whose Freedom?: The Battle Over America’s Most Important Idea by George Lakoff.
This book makes a few good points about what cognitive science tells us about differing concepts associated with the word freedom. But most of the book consists of attempts to explain his opponents’ world view that amount to defending his world view by stereotyping his opponents as simplistic.
Even when I agree that the people he’s criticizing are making mistakes due to framing errors, I find his analysis very implausible. E.g. he explains Bush’s rationalization of Iraqi deaths as “Those killed and maimed don’t count, since they are outside the war frame. Moreover, Bush has done nothing via direct causation to harm any Iraqis and so has not imposed on their freedom”. Anyone who bothers to listen to Bush can see a much less stupid rationalization – Bush imagines we’re in a rerun of World War II, where the Forces of Evil have made it inevitable that some innocent people will die, and keeping U.S. hands clean will allow Evil to spread.
Lakoff’s insistence that his opponents are unable to understand indirect, systematic causation is ironic, since he shows no familiarity with most of the relevant science of complex effects of human action (e.g. economics, especially public choice economics).
He devotes only one sentence to what I regard as the biggest single difference between his worldview and his opponents’: his opponents believe in “Behavior as naturally governed by rewards and punishments.”
His use of the phrase “idea theft” to describe uses of the word freedom that differ from his use of that word is objectionable both due to the problems with treating ideas as property and with his false implication that his concept of freedom resembles the traditional U.S. concept of freedom (here’s an example of how he rejects important parts of the founders’ worldview: “One of the biggest mistakes of the Enlightenment was to counter this claim with the assumption that morality comes from reason. In fact, morality is grounded in empathy”).
If his claims of empathy are more than simply calling his opponents uncaring, then it may help explain his bias toward helping people who are most effective at communicating their emotions. For example, a minimum wage is part of his concept of freedom. People who have their wages increased by a minimum wage law tend to know who they are and often have labor unions to help spread their opinions. Whereas a person whom the minimum wage prevents from getting a job is less likely to see the cause or have a way to tell Lakoff about the resulting harm. (If you doubt the minimum wage causes unemployment, see http://www.nber.org/papers/w12663 for a recent survey of the evidence.)
This is symptomatic of the biggest problem with the book – he assumes political disagreements are the result of framing errors, not differences in understanding of how the world works, and wants to persuade people to frame issues his way rather than to use scientific methods when possible to better measure effects that people disagree about.
The book also contains a number of strange claims where it’s hard to tell whether Lakoff means what he says or is writing carelessly. E.g. “Whenever a case reaches a high court, it is because it does not clearly fit within the established categories of the law.” – I doubt he would deny that Hamdi v. Rumsfeld fit clearly within established habeas corpus law.
This is a book which will tempt people to believe that anyone who agrees with Lakoff’s policy advice is ignorant. But people who want to combat Lakoff’s ideology should resist that temptation to stereotype opponents. There are well-educated people (e.g. some behavioral economists) who have more serious arguments for many of the policies Lakoff recommends.
Politics
A story (not online) in a recent issue of Liberty Magazine reports that research by Arthur C. Brooks shows that people who favor government spending on poverty programs give less to charity than those who don’t support such spending.
If that were only true for monetary donations, there would be a number of plausible questions that could be raised. But Brooks gets around those by showing that it is also true of blood donations.
Brooks’ findings should not be used to justify any particular ideology, since a willingness to act charitably doesn’t necessarily correlate with an understanding of the effects of political policies. It might be interesting to know if a willingness to act charitably correlates with more careful education concerning the effects of political policies, but that would be hard to objectively measure. Brooks’ findings should be used only to discredit people who claim that there’s a simple way to determine that advocates of a welfare state are more compassionate than advocates of smaller government.
Here is an excerpt from Brooks’ book, and other reports on his research are here and here.
Book review: Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism by Robert Pape
This book presents carefully researched evidence that suicide bombers are motivated primarily by a desire to force democracies to withdraw troops from the territories claimed by the bombers, that they use rational strategies to achieve their goals, and that suicide bombers are acting mainly out of a sense of duty (like kamikazes) rather than the insanity of ordinary suicides or a desire for rewards in the afterlife.
The book’s style is fairly dry and slow to read.
He sounds like one of the most objective voices on this subject, although his objectivity is hard to verify. He is so careful to minimize partisan comments that his index only lists one entry for George Bush and none for Clinton. One place where this disappoints me is when he reports that no al-Qaeda suicide attackers came from any country described by the U.S. State Department as sponsoring terrorism. Since this covers a period including nearly 4 years of Clinton’s term, it suggests that the problem of falsely connecting governments such as Saddam’s with al-Qaeda is a more pervasive problem than just one dishonest president (although the State Department used a broader definition of terrorism than the suicide terrorism that the book deals with). I’m disappointed that Pape doesn’t analyze this enough to determine how much of this problem preceded Bush.
His use of the word nationalism to describe al-Qaeda’s aims doesn’t sound quite right, but it is close to the territorial, tribalistic motives that his evidence points to.
It’s only in the last few pages when he departs from reporting research and recommends strategies that he becomes unconvincing. His support for a fence over all of the U.S. – Mexican border seems unrelated to the rest of the book. Does he think stopping people from carrying bombs across the border will help (i.e. that it would be hard for a terrorist to make or buy a weapon after crossing the border)? Or does he hope to stop terrorists from crossing the border (which his book implies would require turning away nearly everyone from Islamic countries with U.S.-backed governments)?
He says “the idea that Islamic fundamentalism is on the verge of world domination … is pure fantasy”. His book provides some evidence for that conclusion, but it involves extrapolating from a small sample of terrorist campaigns to conclude al-Qaeda will stop at achievable goals. I’m uncomfortable with the way he dismissed such an important source of disagreement with excessive confidence and with limited analysis. (I’m also annoyed that he exaggerates the degree of alarmism of his opponents).
The Virgin Earth Challenge would be a great idea if we could count on it being awarded for a solution that resembles the headlines it’s been getting (e.g. $25M Bounty Offered for Global Warming Fix).
But the history of such prizes suggests that even for simple goals, describing the terms of a prize so that inventors can predict what will qualify for the award is nontrivial (e.g. see the longitude prize, where the winner appeared to have clearly met the conditions specified, yet wasn’t awarded the prize for 12 years because the solution didn’t meet the preconceptions of the board that judged it).
Anyone who looks past the media coverage and finds the terms of the challenge will see that the criteria are intended to be a good deal more complex than those of the longitude prize, that there’s plenty of ambiguity in them (although it’s possible they plan to make them clearer later), and that the panel of judges could be considered to be less impartial than the ideal one might hope for.
The criterion of “commercial viability” tends to suggest that a solution that required additional charitable donations to implement might be rejected even if there were donors who thought it worthy of funding, yet I doubt that’s consistent with the intent behind the prize. This ambiguity looks like simple carelessness.
The criterion of “harmful effects and/or other incidental consequences of the solution” represents a more disturbing ambiguity. Suppose I create nanobots which spread throughout the biosphere and sequester CO2 in a manner that offends some environmentalists’ feelings that the biosphere ought to be left in its natural state, but otherwise does no harm. How would these feelings be factored into the decision about whether to award the prize? Not to mention minor ambiguities such as whether making a coal worker’s job obsolete or reducing crop yields due to reduced atmospheric CO2 counts as a harmful effect.
I invite everyone who thinks Branson and Gore are serious about paying out the prize to contact them and ask that they clarify their criteria.
This rather discouraging blog post provides some unusual analogies to historical conflicts that might help predict what will happen in Iraq. The analogies aren’t exact enough to be convincing by themselves, but are close enough to deserve some attention.
This book does an excellent job of reporting important evidence showing that group decisions can be wiser than those of any one individual. He makes some good attempts to describe what conditions cause groups to be wiser than individuals, but when he goes beyond reporting academic research, the quality of the book declines. He exaggerates enough to give critics excuses to reject the valuable parts of the book.
He lists four conditions that he claims determine whether groups are wiser than their individual members. I’m uncertain whether the conditions he lists are sufficient. I would have added something explicit about the need to minimize biases. It’s unclear whether that condition follows from his independence condition, partly because he’s a bit vague about whether he uses independence in the strong sense that statisticians do or whether he’s speaking more colloquially.
Sometimes he ignores those conditions and makes unconvincing blanket statements that larger groups will produce wiser decisions.
He makes exaggerated claims for the idea that crowds are wise due to information possessed by lots of average people rather than the influence of a few wise people. For instance, he disputes a Forsythe et al. paper which argues that a small number of “marginal traders” in a market to predict the 1988 presidential vote were responsible for the price accuracy. Surowiecki’s rejection of this argument depends on a claim that “two investors with the same amount of capital have the same influence on market prices”. But that looks false. For example, if the nonmarginal traders make all their trades on the first day and then blindly hold for a year, and the marginal traders trade with each other over that year in response to new information, prices on most days will be determined by the marginal traders.
It’s not designed to be an investment advice book, but if judged solely as a book on investment, I’d say it ranks in the top ten. It does a very good job of explaining both what’s right and what’s wrong with the random walk theory of the stock market.
He does a good job of ridiculing the “cult of the CEO” whereby most of a company’s value is attributed to its CEO (at least in the U.S.). I was surprised by his report that 95% of investors said they would buy stocks based on their opinion of the CEO. They certainly didn’t get that attitude from successful investors (who seem to do that only in rare cases where they are able to talk at length with the CEO). But his claim that “Corporate profit margins did not increase over the course of the 1990s, even as executive compensation was soaring” looks false, as well as being of questionable relevance to his points about executives being overvalued. And I wish he had also applied his argument to beliefs of the form “if we could just elect a good person to lead the nation”.
Chapter 6 does a good job of combining the best ideas from Wright’s book Nonzero and Fukuyama’s Trust (oddly, he doesn’t cite Trust).
He exaggerates reports that the stock market responded accurately to the Challenger explosion before any public reports indicated the cause. He claims “within a half hour of the shuttle blowing up, the stock market knew what company was responsible.” I don’t know where he gets the “half hour” time period. The paper he cites as the source says the market “pinpointed” Thiokol as the culprit “within an hour”, but it exaggerates a bit. If the percent decline in stock price is the best criterion, then the market provided strong evidence within an hour. If the dollar value of the loss of market capitalization is the best criterion, then the evidence was weak after one hour but strong within four hours.
He also claims “Savvy insiders alone did not cause that first-day drop in Thiokol’s price.”, but shows no sign that he could know whether this is true. He seems to base on the absence of reported selling by executives whom the law requires to report such selling, but he appears to overestimate how reliably that law is obeyed, and to ignore a large number of non-executive insiders (e.g. engineers). He does pass on a nice quote which better illustrates our understanding of these issues: “While markets appear to work in practice, we are not sure how they work in theory.”
Nick Szabo has a
I have one complaint: he says “acid rain in the 1970s and 80s was a scare almost as big global warming is today”. I remember the acid rain concerns of the 1970s well enough to know that this is a good deal of an exaggeration. Acid rain alarmists said a lot about the potential harm to forests and statues, but to the extent they talked about measurable harm to people, it was a good deal vaguer than with global warming, and if it could have been quantified it would probably have implied at least an order of magnitude less measurable harm to people than what mainstream academics are suggesting global warming could cause.
Mike Linksvayer has a fairly good argument that raising X dollars by running ads on Wikipedia won’t create more conflict of interest than raising X dollars some other way.
But the amount of money an organization handles has important effects on its behavior that are somewhat independent of the source of the money, and the purpose of ads seems to be to drastically increase the money that they raise.
I can’t provide a single example that provides compelling evidence in isolation, but I think that looking at a broad range of organizations with $100 million revenues versus a broad range of organizations that are run by volunteers who only raise enough money to pay for hardware costs, I see signs of big differences in the attitudes of the people in charge.
Wealthy organizations tend to attract people who want (or corrupt people into wanting) job security or revenue maximization, whereas low-budget volunteer organizations tend to be run by people motivated by reputation. If reputational motivations have worked rather well for an organization (as I suspect the have for Wikipedia), we should be cautious about replacing those with financial incentives.
It’s possible that the Wikimedia Foundation could spend hundreds of millions of dollars wisely on charity, but the track record of large foundations does not suggest that should be the default expectation.
Book review: An Inconvenient Truth: The Planetary Emergency of Global Warming and What We Can Do About It by Al Gore
I read An Inconvenient Truth in book form rather than watching the movie because I’m generally suspicious of attempts to convey serious arguments via film, and expected that the book version would have better references to the sources of his claims. Alas, this is merely a movie copied to paper, and his idea of a technical reference is a label such as “source: science magazine”.
This may be more scholarly than what a typical politician would produce, but it’s poor scholarship compared to what I’d expect from a typical college professor, even allowing for the goal of reaching a wide audience by keeping it simple.
The book is full of exaggerations and misleading impressions (but is usually not explicit enough to be clearly false). It is hard to say whether the book is helping by offsetting myths from the other extreme or whether it is adding to the confusion. Gore does deserve some credit for bringing more attention to a fairly serious problem.
Much of the book is pictures showing examples of climate changes, which don’t by themselves say whether we’ve experienced anything more than normal fluctuations. The movie may have reached people who thought climates were more stable than that, but I doubt the book will.
His main attempt to show evidence that CO2 emissions cause warming is a graph showing CO2 levels and temperature over the last 600,000 years. It sure looks like there’s a strong correlation. But my crude attempts at comparing the timing of the changes suggest that temperature changes precede CO2 changes more often than they follow them. I can imagine ways that the correlation could be caused by temperature changes causing changes in CO2 levels. I don’t see how a non-expert can tell what this correlation implies except by relying on authority (experts seem to think the causation works in both directions).
So that leaves him with only appeals to authority to back up his claims. He’s more credible there. His claim of a scientific consensus is approximately right. He lists the “percentage of articles in doubt as to the cause of global warming: 0%”. The paper he’s apparently referencing is responsible enough to use words such as “likely” rather than claiming an absence of doubt. Peter Norvig‘s analysis of some of those papers concludes at least 4 of those papers expressed doubt. But that difference is probably too subtle to matter to the people this book is targeting.
Gore is quick to blame big oil for the popular press’s false impressions of scientific controversy. The possibility that controversy sells stories appears to be at least as strong an explanation, but blaming the people Gore’s trying to convince would be rather inconvenient.
Pages 183 to 196 appear designed to create fears that sea levels could rise 18 to 20 feet suddenly and unpredictably. He doesn’t say anything about how fast experts think this might happen (which seems to be over many decades). The hints he gives are the mention of an ice shelf than unexpectedly broke up in 35 days, and some maps Greenland which appear to suggest the ice there could vanish in the next decade. The difference between an expected sea level rise over many decades and an unexpected rise over less than a decade makes a big difference in how well people could adapt to it. (The mass migrations in China recently demonstrate the feasibility of adapting to sea level changes in a decade or two). Gore appears to be contributing to fears of changes that are way outside the expert consensus.
Gore underestimates human ability to adapt to climate change (much as those on the other extreme underestimate human ability to invent affordable ways to reduce carbon emissions). For example, he implies that quick efforts to mitigate global warming are the only way to deal with the risks of drinking water shortages. But I see signs that cheaper desalinization is a more promising approach.
His graph on page 276 of “U.S. renewable energy future” is strange. Renewability has a weak connection to global warming solutions, but the possibility that nuclear power might be desirable seems too inconvenient to him. His forecast for biomass looks too optimistic, his forecast for solar after 2020 looks too pessimistic, and his forecast for wind shows strange fluctuations.
Gore repeats the myth that frogs won’t jump out of water that’s slowly brought to a boil, and claims that sometimes people make the same mistake. “Sometimes” is too uninformative to refute, but the most relevant research that I can think of suggests that at least political experts are biased toward sounding alarms too often.
He claims it’s “absolutely indisputable” that global warming is a “planetary emergency”. Yet nothing he says implies that stopping global warming is as urgent as reducing poverty, war, or disease.
Ph.D. economists seem fairly confident that the effects of global warming will be small.
There are substantial disputes among experts about how much of the global warming problem we should try to solve now (see Hal Varian’s comments, Tyler Cowen’s comments and Arnold Kling’s comments). But you won’t find any hint of that controversy in An Inconvenient Truth (in part because it’s hard to describe in ways that laymen can understand).
Gore recommends doing many things to slow down global warming a bit (but may leave many with the impression that his plans would do more than that – if it were an emergency as he says, wouldn’t he recommend more?).
Some of these steps are clearly good even if their effects on the climate are trivial.
For some (recycling and locally grown food) I’ve seen conflicting claims and can’t tell whether objective analyses exist.
Some are misleading. He claims a “fuel-cell vehicle (FCV) that uses pure hydrogen produces no pollutants”, which would be true if we had a convenient source of pure hydrogen. But on this planet, hydrogen requires energy to create, and only acts as a battery, so FCVs cause pollution if energy production causes pollution.
I recommend Ron Baily’s review for additional criticisms.
Disclosure: I own stocks in oil companies and in a company that serves the photovoltaic industry.
I’m wondering why the use of shame and humiliation isn’t used more often as an alternative to jail sentences.
The most plausible objection I’ve found seems to be that there are other alternatives that are better than those two choices. But even if that’s true, there are enough doubts about public acceptance of those possibly better alternatives that it seems odd not to give some encouragement to an alternative to prison that seems to have some political feasibility.