Influence

Posted by Peter on February 26, 2009
Posted in: Book Reviews, The Human Mind. Tagged: .

Book review: Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion by Robert B. Cialdini.

This book gives clear descriptions of six strategies that salesmen use to influence customers, and provides advice on how we can somewhat reduce our vulnerability to being exploited by them. It is one of the best books for laymen about heuristics and biases.

It shows why the simplest quick fixes would produce more problems than they solve, by showing that there are good reasons why we use heuristics that create opportunities for people to exploit us.

The author’s willingness to admit that he has been exploited by these strategies makes it harder for readers to dismiss the risks as something only fools fall for.

Livejournal

Posted by Peter on February 16, 2009
Posted in: Announcements [B].

I’ve had a livejournal account for quite a while, but for a long time used it only to comment on other peoples’ posts. But I’ve decided it’s a more social place to blog, and I’ve been making some more personal posts there. I’ve noticed that I am most likely to decide that someone is interesting if that person discusses personal thoughts on the web, and a report that self-disclosure in blogs may help develop better relationships with others helps confirm that I’m not the only one to react that way.

I plan to keep posting my more impersonal intellectual writings here around 3 times per month, but I may devote more attention to my livejournal account than to this blog.

The Spriggan Mirror

Posted by Peter on February 6, 2009
Posted in: Book Reviews.

Book review: The Spriggan Mirror by Lawrence Watt-Evans.
I normally don’t review fiction, but this has enough intellectual value to be more than just entertainment (although it is primarily entertainment).

This novel does an unusually good job of portraying scientific approaches to analyzing magic (better than the two other Lawrence Watt-Evans novels I’ve read).So in a sense it ought to be treated as science fiction about a world whose laws of physics happen to resemble those of many fantasies.
It provides a good example of how humans ought to treat a species of beings who are less intelligent than humans but capable of understanding a good deal of human language.
It also raises some unusual questions about personal identity.

You should read With a Single Spell and possibly others in the Ethshar series before reading this.

Body Language

Posted by Peter on January 29, 2009
Posted in: The Human Mind. Tagged: .

I’ve been learning how to read body language and how to alter my body language, and I’m wondering how much of the changes in my body language that I’m hoping to create should be considered honest communications.
Increased eye contact and mimicking a person’s body language seem to be unavoidably genuine expressions of interest. The fact that people can have bad motives for such interest doesn’t seem like it should make me hesitant when my motives for being interested in someone are good.

Posture is harder to evaluate. One function of altering my posture to look as tall as I can is to signal desirable qualities that correlate with height (e.g. good nutrition as a child, leading to good health and a well developed brain). If this led to costly status seeking, I’d feel guilty. But there’s little cost for everyone to match the degree to which I’m looking taller by paying attention to my posture, and little hope that competition for status can be reduced by people such as me ignoring my posture, so I feel negligible guilt.
Another function of posture is to indicate confidence. I’d feel guilty about artificially increasing the confidence I express about a specific factual claim. Most communication is either expressing factual claims of some sort or has no clear content. I’m unsure how to treat the confidence expressed by posture. It seems to say something about some poorly specified anticipated outcomes. Is it mostly a self-fulfilling prophecy, so that it will honestly indicate whether I’m going to be happy in the future even if I alter it in a way that seems artificial? I can’t pin down what it’s expressing well enough to say.

I often hide my hands in my pockets, and that reportedly gets interpreted as saying that I’m hiding something. I suspect this is a false signal. As far as I can recall, when I fail to communicate something that people might want to hear it’s due something like not figuring out whether someone wants to hear it or being too slow to notice a break in a conversation in which to start talking. If I can alter my hand position to better indicate when I’d like people to be more inquisitive about my thoughts, that will improve communication.
Hand movements such as scratching my head that get interpreted as nervousness are more problematic. That scratching does have some correlation with nervousness. I feel a bit dishonest when I hide increased nervousness by consciously resisting my temptation to scratch my head. But some of head scratching habits seem to reflect something other than nervousness (maybe a mild version Dermatillomania associated with obsessive tendencies that fall short of being a disorder), and are probably creating false impressions with most people. I’m unsure whether I can eliminate those false impressions without also eliminating accurate signals.

Honest Signals

Posted by Peter on January 21, 2009
Posted in: Book Reviews, The Human Mind. Tagged: .

Book review: Honest Signals: How They Shape Our World by Alex (Sandy) Pentland.
This book makes it clear that verbal communication is a recent evolutionary development in humans which has only replaced a modest amount of the communication that our pre-linguistic ancestors used. The fact that we are much more aware of our verbal communication than our other forms of communication shouldn’t cause us to underestimate those other forms.
A good deal of the studies mentioned in the book consist of measures of nonverbal communication in, say, speed dating can predict results about as reliably as I’d expect from analyzing the words. These could be criticized for not ruling out the possibility that the nonverbal signals were merely responses to information communicated by words. But at least one study avoids this – entrepreneurs pitching business plans to VCs showed nonverbal signals that were excellent predictors of whether the VCs would accept the business plans, before getting any verbal feedback from the VCs. Even more surprising, investments made by VCs with nonverbal information about the entrepreneurs did better than those evaluated on written-only presentations.
The sociometers used to measure these nonverbal signals have potential to be used in helping group decision making by automatically detecting the beginnings of groupthink or polarization, which should in principle allow leaders to stop those trends before they do much harm. But it’s not obvious whether many people will want to admit that analyzing the words of a conversation has as little importance as this research implies.
One of the more interesting methods of communication is for people to mimic each others body language. This is surprisingly effective at creating mutual interest and agreement.
The sociometer data can be of some value for information aggregators by helping to distinguish independent pieces of information from redundant information by detecting which people are likely to have correlated ideas and which are likely to have independent ideas.
I wish this book were mistaken, and that most of human interaction could be analyzed the way we analyze language. But it seems clear that unconscious parts of our minds contain a good deal of our intelligence.

Imprinted Brain Theory of Autism

Posted by Peter on January 14, 2009
Posted in: The Human Mind. Tagged: .

An unusual hypothesis about autism involves Genomic imprinting (“imbalances in the outcomes of intragenomic conflict between effects of maternally vs. paternally expressed genes.”).

It’s apparently somewhat well established that some regions of the brain are influenced more by paternal genes (the paternal brain), and some by maternally genes (the maternal brain).

The Imprinted Brain theory of autism says that autism results from the paternal brain being more developed, and the maternal brain being less developed, with an increased paternal brain causing Aspergers syndrome, and a reduced maternal brain causing more severe autism.

The father’s genes want the mother to invest more resources in a child than the mother’s genes do. Maternal genes have more desire for child to empathize with her and siblings to make childcare less costly. Paternal genes have more desire for competition between siblings over resources.

I had previously been impressed by a theory in the book Shadow Syndromes that involves a less developed cerebellum causing a slowness to shift one’s attention as a child, which makes one less likely to notice facial expressions. The Imprinted Brain theory can imply this (the cerebellum is one of the maternal brain areas which is underdeveloped).

The evidence is hard to summarize, but here’s an example:

autism increases with paternal (and maternal) age (Gillberg, 1980), and assisted reproduction via intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) may increase the risk for syndromes of dysregulated imprinting, including Angelman and Beckwith-Weideman (Paoloni-Giacobino & Chaillet, 2004; Waterland & Jirtle, 2004; Maher, 2005). Both paternal age and ICSI are expected to contribute to methylated-gene defects, which may include effects on brain-imprinted genes (Waterland & Jirtle, 2004; Malaspina et al., 2005).

I recommend reading the discussion section of the paper, which contains much more information than I can summarize.

The paper also mentions evidence that paranoid schizophrenia is an opposite of autism (involving a highly developed maternal brain) – schizophrenics are more likely than most people to notice/imagine that someone is looking at them (see (Mentalism and mechanism and The eyes have it).

Here is an apparently unrelated argument for schizophrenia and autism being opposites.

A Different Kind of Boy

Posted by Peter on January 7, 2009
Posted in: Book Reviews, The Human Mind. Tagged: .

Book review: A Different Kind of Boy: A Father’s Memoir on Raising a Gifted Child With Autism by Daniel Mont.
This book provides a clear and moving story of what it’s like to have a fairly autistic child. It reinforces my belief that autism (or at least some of the personalities classified as autistic) is one extreme of a range of human personalities. I was surprised at the extent to which Alex’s personality is an extreme version of the personality I had as a child.
The author demonstrates an unusual ability to treat his son as an equal for some purposes (such as logical reasoning) while simultaneously being aware that Alex finds it extremely hard to learn concepts most of us take for granted (e.g. the difference between lying and pretending).
Many of the problems people have interacting with Alex closely resemble the problems AI researchers discover when they try to translate an “obvious” concept into unambiguous language. But just when I thought the AI analogy provides a reliable guide, I noticed an exception – Alex finds long division harder than economic theory.

This Is Burning Man

Posted by Peter on December 29, 2008
Posted in: Book Reviews. Tagged: .

Book review: This Is Burning Man by Brian Doherty.
This book gives a description and history of Burning Man that is mostly consistent with what I know of it. I particularly like how he calls it “a social revolutionary movement that is not about fighting authority but is dedicated to working with it”.
He glosses over the inconsistent beliefs in the culture over property rights. He has one brief mention of bicycle theft without much indication of how big a problem it is or how it affects the culture. He occasionally implies it’s considered ok to destroy someone else’s possessions, but doesn’t provide a clear enough description of how much of a cultural difference that is.
He describes some of the disagreements over the what Burning Man should be, including some early disputes over whether it was ok for it to become an art festival, and whether attempts to introduce political advertising fits well with the anti-commercial rules. He suggests that control of the culture is sufficiently decentralized that no small group can decide the answers to those disputes.
The main hint he provides for those hoping to create similar events elsewhere is beyond some minimum level of safety and logistics planning, the success or failure is largely in the hands of participants rather than leaders, and the leaders of Burning Man don’t have a clear idea of how they succeeded.
He suggests that a sense of crisis, mostly due to the hostile environment, helps create a sense of bonding. I think he wildly exaggerates the effects of the physical environment (whose main value is minimizing political objections to Burning Man).

Commons and Transaction Costs

Posted by Peter on December 23, 2008
Posted in: Economics, Freedom.

Mike Linksvayer describes a good perspective on why it’s important to have most information in a commons rather than restricted by copyright.
Most economists have a strong bias toward assuming transaction costs are unimportant. Coase has fought this. It sure looks to me like the Coase Theorem ought to be understood as demonstrating that one of the most important tasks for economists is to improve our understanding of how to reduce transaction costs. Economists have invested too much in models which depend on transaction costs being insignificant to easily be persuaded to adopt such a different focus.

Lessig’s book The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World describes why having some commons can be as valuable as having some resources protected by secure property rights, and why it matters for science and technology. But his argument style is designed for ordinary political debates, and doesn’t provide the breadth or power that a good economist would produce when attempting to reform economics.

I have little idea whether Creative Commons will put additional money to good use, but the value of its goals should not be overlooked.

The Soulful Science?

Posted by Peter on December 15, 2008
Posted in: Economics, Idea Futures. Tagged: .

Book review: The Soulful Science: What Economists Really Do and Why It Matters by Diane Coyle.
This book provides a nice overview of economic theory, with an emphasis on how it has been changing recently. The style is eloquent, but the author is too nerdy to appeal to as wide an audience as she hopes. How many critics of economics will put up with quips such as “my Hamiltonian is bigger than yours!”?

The most thought-provoking part of the book, where she argues that economics has a soul, convinced me she convinced me she’s rather confused about why economics makes people uncomfortable.
One of her few good analogies mentions the similarities between critics of evolution and critics of economics. I wished she had learned more about the motives of her critics from this. Both sciences disturb people because their soulless autistic features destroy cherished illusions.
Evolutionary theory tells us that the world is crueler than we want it to be, and weakens beliefs about humans having something special and immaterial that makes us noble.
Likewise, economics tells us that people aren’t as altruistic as we want them to be, and encourages a mechanistic view of people that interferes with attempts to see mystical virtues in humans.

Some of her defenses of mainstream economics from “post-autistic” criticism deals with archaic uses of the word autistic (abnormal subjectivity, acceptance of fantasy). These disputes seem to be a disorganized mix of good and bad criticisms of mainstream economics that don’t suggest any wholesale rejection of mainstream economics. It’s the uses of autistic that resemble modern medical uses of the term that generate important debates.

She repeats the misleading claim that Malthusian gloom caused Carlyle to call economics the dismal science. This suggests she hasn’t studied critics of economics as well as she thinks. Carlyle’s real reason (defending racism from an assault by economists) shows the benefits of economists’ autistic tendencies. Economists’ mechanistic models and lack of empathy for slaveowners foster a worldview in which having different rules for slaves seemed unnatural (even to economists who viewed slaves as subhuman).

I just happened to run across this thought from an economist describing his autistic child: “his utter inability to comprehend why Jackie Robinson wasn’t welcomed by every major league team”.

She tries to address specific complaints about what economists teach without seeing a broad enough picture to see when those are just symptoms of a broader pattern of discomfort. Hardly anyone criticizes physics courses that teach Newtonian mechanics for their less-accurate-than-Einstein simplifications. When people criticize economics for simplifications in ways that resemble creationists’ complaints about simplifications made in teaching evolution, it seems unwise (and autistic) to avoid modeling deeper reasons that would explain the broad pattern of complaints.
She points to all the effort that economists devote to analyzing empirical data as evidence that economists are in touch with the real world. I’ll bet that analyzing people as numbers confirms critics’ suspicions about how cold and mechanistic economists are.

She seems overconfident about the influence economists have had on monetary and antitrust policies. Anyone familiar with public choice economics would look harder for signs that the agencies in question aren’t following economists’ advice as carefully as they want economists to think.

I’m puzzled by this claim:

The straightforward policy implication [of happiness research] is that to increase national well-being, more people need to have more sex. This doesn’t sound like a reasonable economic policy prescription

She provides no explanation of why we shouldn’t conclude that sex should replace some other leisure activities. It’s not obvious that there are policies which would accomplish this goal, but it sure looks like economists aren’t paying as much attention to this issue as they ought to.

She appears wrong when she claims that it’s reasonable to assume prediction market traders are risk neutral, and that that is sufficient to make prediction market prices reflect probabilities. Anyone interested in this should instead follow her reference to Manski’s discussion and see the response by Justin Wolfers and Eric Zitzewitz.