Economics

Drive

Posted by Peter on August 31, 2010
Posted in: Economics, The Human Mind. Tagged: , , , .

Book review: Drive: The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us, by Daniel H. Pink.

This book explores some of the complexities of what motivates humans. It attacks a stereotype that says only financial rewards matter, and exaggerates the extent to which people adopt that fallacy. His style is similar to Malcolm Gladwell’s, but with more substance than Gladwell.

The book’s advice is likely to cause some improvement in how businesses are run and in how people choose careers. But I wonder how many bosses will ignore it because their desire to exert control over people outweighs their desire to create successful companies.

I’m not satisfied with the way he and others classify motivations as intrinsic and extrinsic. While feelings of flow may be almost entirely internally generated, other motivations that he classifies as intrinsic seem to involve an important component of feeling that others are rewarding you with higher status/reputation.

Shirking may have been a been an important problem a century ago for which financial rewards were appropriate solutions, but the nature of work has changed so that it’s much less common for workers to want to put less effort into a job. The author implies that this means standard financial rewards have become fairly unimportant factors in determining productivity. I think he underestimates the importance they play in determining how goals are prioritized.

He believes the changes in work that reduced the importance of financial incentives was the replacement of rule-following routine work with work that requires creativity. I suggest that another factor was that in 1900, work often required muscle-power that consumed almost as much energy as a worker could afford to feed himself.

He states his claims vaguely enough that they could be interpreted as implying that broad categories of financial incentives (including stock options and equity) work poorly. I checked one of the references that sounded like it might address that (“When performance-related pay backfires”), and found it only dealt with payments for completing specific tasks.

His complaints about excessive focus on quarterly earnings probably have some value, but it’s important to remember that it’s easy to err in the other direction as well (the dot-com bubble seemed to coincide with an unusual amount of effort at focusing on earnings 5 to 10 years away).

I’m disappointed that he advises not to encourage workers to compete against each other without offering evidence about its effects.

One interesting story is the bonus system at Kimley-Horn and Associates, where any employee can award another employee $50 for doing something exceptional. I’d be interested in more tests of this – is there something special about Kimley-Horn that prevents abuse, or would it work in most companies?

Disadvantages of Stories

Posted by Peter on August 12, 2010
Posted in: Investing, The Human Mind.

Tyler Cowen has a good video describing why we shouldn’t be too influenced by stories. He exaggerates a bit when he says

There are only a few basic stories. If you think in stories, that means you are telling yourself the same thing over and over

but his point that stories allow storytellers to manipulate our minds deserves more emphasis. For me, one of the hardest parts of learning how to beat the stock market was to admit that I did poorly when I was influenced by stories, and did well mainly when I relied on numbers that are available and standardized for most companies, and on mechanical rules which varied little between companies (I sometimes use different rules for different industries, but beyond that I try to avoid adapting my approach to different circumstances).

For example, The stories I heard about Enron’s innovative management style gave me a gut feeling that it was a promising investment. But its numbers showed an uninteresting company, and persuaded me to postpone any investment.

But I’ve only told you a story here (it’s so much easier to do than provide rigorous evidence). If you really want good reasons, try testing for yourself story versus non-story approaches to something like the stock market.

(HT Patri).

An Improved Automated Market Maker

Posted by Peter on June 21, 2010
Posted in: Idea Futures. Tagged: , .

[See here and here for some context.]

John Salvatier has drawn my attention to a paper describing A Practical Liquidity-Sensitive Automated Market Maker [pdf] which fixes some of the drawbacks of the Automated Market Maker that Robin Hanson proposed.

Most importantly, it provides a good chance that the market maker makes money in roughly the manner that a profit-oriented human market maker would.

It starts out by providing a small amount of liquidity, and increases the amount of liquidity it provides as it profits from providing liquidity. This allows markets to initially make large moves in response to a small amount of trading volume, and then as a trading range develops that reflects agreement among traders, it takes increasingly large amounts of money to move the price.

A disadvantage of following this approach is that it provides little reward to being one of the first traders. If traders need to do a fair amount of research to evaluate the contract being traded, it may be that nobody is willing to inform himself without an expectation that trading volume will become significant. Robin Hanson’s version of the market maker is designed to subsidize this research. If we can predict that several traders will actively trade the contract without a clear-cut subsidy, then the liquidity-sensitive version of the market maker is likely to be appropriate. If we can predict that a subsidy is needed to generate trading activity, then the best approach is likely to be some combination of the two versions. The difficulty of predicting how much subsidy is needed to generate trading volume leaves much uncertainty.

[Updated 2010-07-01:
I’ve reread the paper more carefully in response to John’s question, and I see I was confused by the reference to “a variable b(q) that increases with market volume”. It seems that it is almost unrelated to what I think of as market volume, and is probably better described as related to the market maker’s holdings.

That means that the subsidy is less concentrated on later trading than I originally thought. If the first trader moves the price most of the way to the final price, he gets most of the subsidy. If the first trader is hesitant and wants to see that other traders don’t quickly find information that causes them to bet much against the first trader, then the first trader probably gets a good deal less subsidy under the new algorithm. The latter comes closer to describing how I approach trading on an Intrade contract where I’m the first to place orders.

I also wonder about the paper’s goal of preserving path independence. It seems to provide some mathematical elegance, but I suspect the market maker can do better if it is allowed to make a profit if the market cycles back to a prior state.
]

Awakening Giants

Posted by Peter on June 3, 2010
Posted in: Book Reviews, China, Economics.

Book review: Awakening Giants, Feet of Clay: Assessing the Economic Rise of China and India by Pranab Bardhan.

This short book has a few interesting ideas.

The most surprising ones involve favorable claims about China’s collectivist period (but without any claim that that period was better overall).

China under Mao apparently had a fairly decentralized economic system, with reasonable performance-based incentives for local officials, which meant that switching to functioning capitalism required less change than in Russia.

Chinese health apparently improved under Mao (in spite of famine), possibly more than it has since, at least by important measures such as life expectancy. This is reportedly due to more organized and widespread measures against ordinary communicable diseases under collectivism.

Stock Market Liquidity

Posted by Peter on May 11, 2010
Posted in: Investing. Tagged: .

One simple way to prevent fluctuations like those of last Thursday would be for stock exchanges to prohibit orders to buy or sell at the market.

That wouldn’t mean prohibiting orders that act a lot like market orders. People could still be allowed to place an order to sell at a limit of a penny. But having an explicit limit price would discourage people from entering orders that under rare conditions end up being executed at a price 99 percent lower than expected.

It wouldn’t even require that people take the time to type in a limit price. Systems could be designed to have a pseudo-market order that behaves a lot like existing market orders, but which has a default limit price that is, say, 5 percent worse than the last reported price.

However, it’s not obvious to me that those of us who didn’t sell at ridiculously low prices should want any changes in the system. Moderate amounts of money were transferred mainly from people who mistakenly thought they were sophisticated traders to people who actually were. People who are aware that they are amateurs rarely react fast enough to declines to have done anything before prices recovered. The decline looked like it was primarily the result of stop-loss strategies, and it’s hard to implement those without at least superficially imitating an expert investor.

This Time is Different

Posted by Peter on March 11, 2010
Posted in: Book Reviews, Economics, U.S. Politics. Tagged: , , .

Book review: This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly by Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff.

This book documents better than any prior book the history of banking and government debt crises. Most of it is unsurprising to those familiar with the subject. It has more comprehensive data than I’ve seen before.

It is easier reading than the length would suggest (it has many tables of data, and few readers will be tempted to read all the data). It is relatively objective. That makes it less exciting than the more ideological writings on the subject.

The comparisons between well governed and poorly governed countries show that governments can become mature enough that defaults on government debt and hyperinflation are rare or eliminated, but there is little different in banking crises between different types of government / economies.

They claim that international capital mobility has produced banking crises, but don’t convince me that they understand the causality behind the correlation. I’d guess that one causal factor is that the optimism that produces bubbles causes more investors to move money into countries they understand less well than their home country, which means their money is more likely to end up in reckless institutions.

The book ends with tentative guesses about which countries are about to become mature enough to avoid sovereign debt crises. Among the seven candidates is Greece, which is now looking like a poor guess less than a half year after it was published.

A Splendid Exchange

Posted by Peter on February 12, 2010
Posted in: Book Reviews, Economics. Tagged: .

Book Review: A Splendid Exchange: How Trade Shaped the World by William J. Bernstein.

This book starts off as a relatively ordinary history book, then toward the end offers a moderate number of valuable insights. Those insights don’t appear to be original, but he performs a valuable service by drawing attention to ideas that aren’t as widely known as they should be.

He argues that the Boston Tea Party was intended to keep tea prices high, and instigated by the merchants who were threatened by increased competition, using the much of the same rhetoric that modern protectionists use.

He describes a strong connection between a decrease in the price of mailing a letter and the ability of people of ordinary wealth to organize opposition to the Corn Laws.

He has an interesting argument that the benefits of international trade is the resulting desire for peace between people who have business relationships with each other, rather than the more obvious but apparently small benefits that are more direct. I wish there were stronger evidence that trade generates peace.

He makes a moderate number of claims that seem poorly thought out. E.g. “a national or central bank” is “the bedrock financial institution of the modern world”.

Foresight 2010

Posted by Peter on January 19, 2010
Posted in: Artificial Intelligence, Idea Futures, Life, the Universe, and Everything. Tagged: , , , .

Some comments on last weekend’s Foresight Conference:

At lunch on Sunday I was in a group dominated by a discussion between Robin Hanson and Eliezer Yudkowsky over the relative plausibility of new intelligences having a variety of different goal systems versus a single goal system (as in a society of uploads versus Friendly AI). Some of the debate focused on how unified existing minds are, with Eliezer claiming that dogs mostly don’t have conflicting desires in different parts of their minds, and Robin and others claiming such conflicts are common (e.g. when deciding whether to eat food the dog has been told not to eat).

One test Eliezer suggested for the power of systems with a unified goal system is that if Robin were right, bacteria would have outcompeted humans. That got me wondering whether there’s an appropriate criterion by which humans can be said to have outcompeted bacteria. The most obvious criterion on which humans and bacteria are trying to compete is how many copies of their DNA exist. Using biomass as a proxy, bacteria are winning by several orders of magnitude. Another possible criterion is impact on large-scale features of Earth. Humans have not yet done anything that seems as big as the catastrophic changes to the atmosphere (“the oxygen crisis”) produced by bacteria. Am I overlooking other appropriate criteria?

Kartik Gada described two humanitarian innovation prizes that bear some resemblance to a valuable approach to helping the world’s poorest billion people, but will be hard to turn into something with a reasonable chance of success. The Water Liberation Prize would be pretty hard to judge. Suppose I submit a water filter that I claim qualifies for the prize. How will the judges test the drinkability of the water and the reusability of the filter under common third world conditions (which I suspect vary a lot and which probably won’t be adequately duplicated where the judges live)? Will they ship sample devices to a number of third world locations and ask whether it produces water that tastes good, or will they do rigorous tests of water safety? With a hoped for prize of $50,000, I doubt they can afford very good tests. The Personal Manufacturing Prizes seem somewhat more carefully thought out, but need some revision. The “three different materials” criterion is not enough to rule out overly specialized devices without some clear guidelines about which differences are important and which are trivial. Setting specific award dates appears to assume an implausible ability to predict how soon such a device will become feasible. The possibility that some parts of the device are patented is tricky to handle, as it isn’t cheap to verify the absence of crippling patents.

There was a debate on futarchy between Robin Hanson and Mencius Moldbug. Moldbug’s argument seems to boil down to the absence of a guarantee that futarchy will avoid problems related to manipulation/conflicts of interest. It’s unclear whether he thinks his preferred form of government would guarantee any solution to those problems, and he rejects empirical tests that might compare the extent of those problems under the alternative systems. Still, Moldbug concedes enough that it should be possible to incorporate most of the value of futarchy within his preferred form of government without rejecting his views. He wants to limit trading to the equivalent of the government’s stockholders. Accepting that limitation isn’t likely to impair the markets much, and may make futarchy more palatable to people who share Moldbug’s superstitions about markets.

City of Gold

Posted by Peter on January 9, 2010
Posted in: Book Reviews, Economics, Mideast. Tagged: , .

Book review: City of Gold: Dubai and the Dream of Capitalism by Jim Krane.

This book describes how a nearly barren piece of land became a prosperous city. Dubai sounds like what you’d expect if Bill Gates had taken over a small desert tribe and turned it into a real estate development company.

Part of its success is due to having the right amount of oil given its population size. Most non-industrialized countries that find enough oil to affect their economy are corrupted by dependence on it and by political fighting over who profits from it. Dubai found enough to finance a good deal of growth, but quickly saw that oil revenues would decline before long. Also, it had few enough people that the ruling family could afford to buy off any potential opposition.

But Dubai’s development started before it had much hope for oil money, and is partly due to the ambitions of a few people who ruled it. There must be a fair amount of luck involved – it seems to be an accident that Dubai is ruled by competent businessmen who are uninterested in politics (one ordered his reluctant brother to become the ruler). British rule over the region early on also helped ensure political stability.

The book’s description of Dubai’s legal system is confusing. How did a tribe with no tradition of private property make investors feel safe? I’ve read elsewhere that importing a British judge and British common law to the financial district is part of the explanation. The rest of Dubai seems to manage with virtually no legal system. I’m still puzzled about how Dubai provides enough predictability to attract large investments.

He describes Dubai’s lack of democracy as “an embarrassment”. But most of the book suggests that Dubai has been doing better than a democracy could. It makes much faster decisions than a democracy, and it forces bureaucrats to compete for performance scores that would be too easily gamed if voters were in charge.

Dubai’s ambitious expansion has made it resemble a financial bubble for much of the past 55 years, but most of its gambles have succeeded. This makes me wonder how to distinguish similar expansions from bubbles in the future (or in China, the present).

Dubai is an important model for how seasteads might develop, and will compete with any seastead.

The author has a modest pro-Dubai bias, but reports some serious problems such as workers being unable to leave because their passports has been confiscated, and wasteful subsidies of energy and water prices.

He claims that until 2008 the region “hadn’t experienced a financial shock for more than three decades”. Was the 1982 Kuwaiti stock market crash in a different region? It’s not obvious where to get enough financial data to say how the shock from that affected Dubai.

Finding Alpha

Posted by Peter on December 1, 2009
Posted in: Investing. Tagged: , .

Book review: Finding Alpha: The Search for Alpha When Risk and Return Break Down by Eric Falkenstein.

This book presents mostly convincing arguments that refute the basic principle of CAPM that riskier investments are rewarded with higher returns, and the relation between risk and returns is better explained by modeling investors as wanting high returns relative to other investors rather than high absolute returns. But the quality of the arguments is quite variable. Much of the book assumes a good understanding of finance theory. If you don’t understand the importance of a Sharpe ratio, you’re not in his target audience.

I was not convinced by his most heavily emphasized empirical claim, that returns on equities are unrelated to beta because controlling for size eliminates the apparent relation. There’s enough connection between size and risk that this raises many questions he doesn’t answer (e.g. JB Berk, A critique of size-related anomalies). But later on he devotes a chapter to a wide variety of evidence that overcomes these concerns, and somewhat supports his claim that for riskier investments, the correlation between risk and return is negative (for the safest investments, it’s positive). And the authoritative Fama and French paper has more convincing evidence about beta – even without controlling for size, the correlation between beta and returns vanished during the 1963 to 1990 period.

He claims that the equity risk premium is effectively zero for a typical investor. His attempt to add up the different adjustments is confusing. He concludes with a table showing size adjustments to that standard estimate that add up to a mind-boggling 15 percent, which would result in a “premium” of -9 percent or so. But adding them is clearly wrong – the tax adjustment assumes the absence of some of the other adjustments. Still, the arguments he assembles from other researchers imply a good chance that the sign of the equity risk premium varies with the time period over which it’s measured.

He suggests some strategies to invest more wisely as a result of the ideas he presents, which he aptly summarizes as “selling hope relative to the market” (i.e. treating volatile stocks as overpriced due to a hope premium). But claiming this produces “superior returns, with less risk however measured” is too strong. Financial risk is not the only relevant measure of risk. Following his advice has social risks that he hints at elsewhere. Being invested in boring stocks in a bubble impairs your ability to engage in some interesting conversations, and you won’t make up for that by mentioning how you outperform the market in times when other want to avoid remembering their investments. Is it possible to minimize both kinds of risks by investing token amounts in ways that trendy folks are talking about, and investing most of your money to maximize your Sharpe ratio? Or does that require too much cognitive dissonance?

The book encourages pessimism, especially about the effects of people wanting relative wealth, and makes disturbing claims such as “Envy is necessary for compassion”.

He provides a number of other good ideas about investing, such as the possibility that the internet bubble adds a big anomaly to many data sets used for backtesting.