Economics

Tradesports Claim Definition

Posted by Peter on August 16, 2006
Posted in: Idea Futures. Tagged: .

Chris Hibbert writes (in a post that is partly about the mess resulting from Tradesports’ contract on North Korean missile launches):

The fact that pay-outs are limited to the amount spent to purchase claims is integral to the institution of prediction markets. If market operators ever pay off both sides of a claim, that is likely to encourage investors to protest many more close calls.

I disagree. Having pay-outs equal to claim purchases is integral to the normal function of well-written claims, but there’s little reason to stick to that rule with a claim written as poorly as the North Korean missile claim was.
Paying off both sides was the most reasonable suggestion I’ve heard for what Tradesports should have done to limit the damage to their reputation. Experience with similar disputes (such as those on FX) suggests that traders already have sufficient motive to protest questionable decisions that it’s hard to see how disputes produced only by additional incentives could bear much resemblance to reasonable disputes. The increased incentive on Tradesports to word their claims so that fewer people misunderstand how they will be judged is likely to have some desirable effects on how Tradesports explains the meaning of their contracts.
Disputed judgments might be inevitable for exchanges that cover subjects as ambitious as Tradesports does, but there’s nothing inevitable about confusion about whether a contract was about DoD confirmation of where the missiles landed, or whether it was about what the missiles did, with DoD statements merely being used if needed to resolve any uncertainty.
(I didn’t trade any of the North Korean missile contracts).

How to Weight Holdings in Stock Funds

Posted by Peter on June 17, 2006
Posted in: Investing. Tagged: .

For those investors who (unlike me) can’t afford to do fundamental analysis on a large number of companies (and if you can’t afford to analyze thousands of companies, you’re probably using a questionable method to select which ones to analyze), there’s a new class of ETFs which sounds like fixes some of the worst problems with typical stock funds.
Most people invest in funds that are based on a capitalization weighted index, which means that any time there’s a bubble affecting some of the stocks in the index, the fund is buying those stocks at the peak. The more popular those funds are, the easier it is to create bubbles in the stocks they buy.
There’s a new ETF (symbol PRF) that weights its holdings on dividends instead, which will sell stocks that are affected by bubbles (except in the unusual case where the company increases its dividend in step with the bubble).
The Political Calculations blog mentions similar strategies which appear to work about as well (the dividend weighting selects against small immature companies, and it ought to be possible to avoid that).
Weighting on revenues sounds like it works well, although it overweights retailers and underweights successful pharmaceutical companies and oil producers that find cheap sources of oil.
Weighting on the number of employees should work (although that underweights companies that outsource).
I’m somewhat partial to weighting on book value, but instead of the standard book value, I’d use tangible book value plus an estimate of amortized R&D expenses.
Shorting the 5 or 10 companies with the largest market capitalizations would probably be a good way to invest a modest portion of a portfolio in a way that would reduce risk and improve returns.
These strategies do have the potential to underperform if they becomes as popular as buying and holding S&P 500 funds was around 2000, but it will take some time to become that trendy, and even if it does there will probably still be funds using unpopular versions of fundamental weighting that will remain good investments.

Gold and the Great Depression

Posted by Peter on May 20, 2006
Posted in: Economics. Tagged: .

Richard Timberlake’s article in the June 2006 issue of Liberty makes some arguments about the causes of the Great Depression that are tempting to believe but at best only partly convincing.
Much of the article is about the Fed becoming dominated by followers of the real bill doctrine. While he presents evidence that leaders of the Fed liked the doctrine, and I can imagine that following that doctrine could explain much of the 1930-1932 contraction. But if the Fed was fully following that doctrine and that were the primary cause of the contraction, the narrow measures of the money supply (which are the ones most directly under the Fed’s control) would have contracted, when they actually expanded during 1930-1932. So I doubt that the Fed was as influenced by the doctrine as Timberlake suggests. But as a factor contributing to the Fed’s caution about expanding the money supply further, it’s fairly plausible, and causes me to be a bit more skeptical of the Fed’s competence than I was before.
The more interesting part of the article is the attempt to deny that the gold standard did anything to cause the contraction. Timberlake notes that the Fed’s gold reserves remained well above the legally required minimum, and claims that shows the Fed wasn’t constrained from expanding the money supply by risks to the gold standard. But that’s true only if the legally required reserves were either sufficient to cover all potential claims or to convince holders of paper dollars that all likely claims would be satisfied. I’m not aware of any clear reason to think this was the case, and it’s easy to imagine that the Fed knew more than Timberlake does about how eager holders of paper dollars would have been to demand gold if the Fed’s gold reserves had dropped further. So I’m still inclined to think that the Fed’s restraint in late 1931 and 1932 resulted from a somewhat plausible belief that it couldn’t do more without taking excessive risk that the gold standard would fail and that we would be stuck with the kind of inflation-prone system that we ended up with anyway.

When Genius Failed

Posted by Peter on April 12, 2006
Posted in: Book Reviews, Investing. Tagged: , .

Book Review: When Genius Failed : The Rise and Fall of Long-Term Capital Management by Roger Lowenstein
This is a very readable and mostly convincing account of the rise and fall of Long-Term Capital Management. It makes it clear to me how the fairly common problem of success breeding overconfidence led LTCM to make unreasonable gambles, and why other financial institutions that risked their money by dealing with LTCM failed to require it to exercise a normal degree of caution.
The book occasionally engages in some minor exaggerations that suggest the author is a journalist rather than an expert in finance, but mostly the book appears a good deal more accurate and informed than I expect from a reporter. It is written so that both experts and laymen will enjoy it.
One passage stands out as unusually remarkable. “The traders hadn’t seen a move like that – ever. True, it had happened in 1987 and again in 1992. But Long-Term’s models didn’t go back that far.” This is really peculiar mistake. The people involved appeared to have enough experience to realize the need to backtest their models better than that. I’m disappointed that the book fails to analyze how this misjudgment was possible.
Also, the author spends a bit too much analysis on LTCM’s overconfidence in their models, when his reporting suggests that a good deal of the problem was due to trading that wasn’t supported by any model.

Nanotech Breakthrough, Stock Price Reaction

Posted by Peter on March 29, 2006
Posted in: Investing, Molecular Assemblers (Advanced Nanotech).

Paul W.K. Rothemund’s cover article on DNA origami in the March 16 issue of Nature appears to represent an order of magnitude increase in the complexity of objects that can self-assemble to roughly atomic precision (whether it’s really atomic precision depends in part on the purposes you’re using it for – every atom is put in a predictable bond connecting it to neighbors, but there’s enough flexibility in the system that the distances between distant atoms generally aren’t what would be considered atomically precise).
It was interesting watching the delayed reaction in the stock price of Nanoscience Technologies Inc. (symbol NANS), which holds possibly relevant patents. Even though I’m a NANS stockholder, have been following the work in the field carefully, and was masochistic enough to read important parts of the relevant patents produced by Ned Seeman several years ago, I have little confidence in my ability to determine whether the Seeman patents cover Rothemund’s design. (If the patents were worded as broadly as many aggressive patents are these days, the answer would probably be yes, but they’re worded fairly responsibly to cover Seeman’s inventions fairly specifically. It’s clear that Seeman’s inventions at least had an important influence on Rothemund’s design.)
It’s pretty rare for a stock price to take days to start reacting to news, but this was an unusual case. Someone reading the Nature article would think the probability of the technique being covered by patents owned by a publicly traded company to be too small to justify a nontrivial search. Hardly anyone was following the company (which I think is a one-person company). I put in bids on the 20th and 21st for some of the stock at prices that were cautious enough not to signal that I was reacting to potentially important news, and picked up a modest number of shares from people who seemed to not know the news or think it irrelevant. Then late on the 21st some heavy buying started. Now it looks like there’s massive uncertainty about what the news means.

The Armchair Economist

Posted by Peter on January 20, 2006
Posted in: Book Reviews, Economics. Tagged: , .

Book Review: The Armchair Economist: Economics And Everyday Experience by Steven Landsburg
This short and eloquent book does a mostly excellent job of explaining to non-economists how economic reasoning works in a wide variety of mostly non-financial areas. But it’s frustrating how he can get so much right but still demonstrate many annoying oversimplifications that economists’ biases make them prone to.
For example, on page 145 he claims that a trash collection company could cheaply prohibit Styrofoam peanuts in the trash by checking everyone’s trash once a year and fining violators $100,000. But anyone who thinks about the economics of such fines will be able to imagine massive costs from people disputing who is responsible for peanuts in the trash. Maybe there are cultures in which such fines would ensure negligible violations, but there are probably as many cultures in which disputes over people putting peanuts in someone else’s trash cans would produce more waste than the peanuts do.
His suggestion of applying antitrust laws to politicians is almost right, but ignores the public choice problems of ensuring that laws marketed as antitrust laws do anything to prevent monopoly. The details of antitrust laws are complex and boring enough that few people other than special interests pay attention to them, so special interests are able to twist the details to turn the laws into forces that protect monopolies.
On page 183 he says “Flood the economy with money and the nominal interest rate goes up in lockstep with inflation”. Given a sufficiently long-term perspective, this is an arguably decent approximation. But he’s disputing the common sense of a typical reporter who is more interested in a short-term perspective under which those changes clearly do not happen in lockstep (on page 216 he provides hints at a theory of why there’s a delayed reaction).
He makes some good points about the similarities between environmentalism and religion, but it seems these points blind him to non-religious motives behind environmentalism. He says on page 227 about relocating polluting industries: “To most economists, this is a self-evident opportunity to make not just Americans but everybody better off.” Maybe if he included a payoff to the U.S. workers whose jobs went overseas, this conclusion would be plausible. But it’s hard enough to figure out how such a payoff should be determined that I suspect he simply ignored that problem.

Oil Futures

Posted by Peter on January 17, 2006
Posted in: Economics, Investing.

Arnold Kling writes some interesting comments about the uses of oil futures markets.

I recall reading that the President of Exxon was forecasting oil prices much lower than the futures markets and thinking that if he believes his own forecast, then he should put his company up for sale.

I think there’s a genuine inconsistency between Exxon’s talk and its actions, but selling the company isn’t the optimum response. We don’t know that Exxon’s stock price currently reflects the prices forecast by the futures market (I decided 6 months ago that energy-related companies were underpriced relative to the futures market and sold my last 2009 futures contract while keeping a large position in energy-related companies) or that the market for large oil companies is liquid enough for Exxon to be sold at a good price. It makes more sense for Exxon to hedge larger fractions of its production by selling more futures contracts.
Maybe the long-date futures markets are illiquid enough that prices would approach what Exxon’s president thinks they should be, in which case Exxon would make slightly more money than under its current policies (assuming the resulting prices are right, which Exxon ought to assume is the best available guess). Or maybe the markets have enough liquidity that Exxon would hedge a large fraction of its production at prices near $60/barrel, which would help Exxon dramatically if Exxon’s president is right, and forgo big profits if he’s wrong. It’s fairly clear the market doesn’t have the liquidity to keep long-dated futures prices over $60/barrel if Exxon tries to make big hedges overnight, but if Exxon were fairly patient about building up the hedge positions, I don’t think we can know what would happen without performing the experiment. There are lots of people out there who think that betting against Exxon would be a good deal. Their confidence in their beliefs remains untested.

The government has all sorts of subsidies for alternative energy. However, the most efficient subsidy would be to buy oil futures contracts. If we must have an energy policy, it should consist solely of strategic futures market purchases.

Buying oil futures contracts would be the least wasteful way to subsidize the solar energy market, where there are many designs that are close to providing competitive mass-produced products. But financial markets are pouring enough money into that market that there’s little reason to think government subsidies are valuable.
Buying oil futures won’t provide the kind of subsidy that, say, fusion advocates would want. If markets are inadequately funding fusion research and government is benevolent enough to do better (a suspicious pair of assumptions, but without assumptions of that nature the popular demand for a government energy policy is a mistake), then oil futures markets won’t solve the problem because the problem is something like markets having inadequate information to target the right research or patents not providing inventors with the optimum fraction of the social benefits of their inventions.

More on the Housing Bubble

Posted by Peter on January 9, 2006
Posted in: Investing. Tagged: .

Last week in a ski lift line I overheard a college-aged guy bragging about how he was making money in the Florida housing market before going to college.
This kind of anecdotal evidence is not as reliable as I would like, but market bubbles rarely have conclusive evidence, so I feel a need to make use of all evidence. If housing market peaks are much like stock market peaks, this is definitely evidence that we are near at least a short-term peak in the housing market.