F.M. Busby’s The Breeds of Man was written in 1988. Many of his expectations for what was then the future are surprising not just because they’re wrong, but because it took me a fair amount of effort to remember that back in 1988 I wouldn’t have dismissed them as silly.
Most of the book takes place in an unspecified year that is no earlier than 2005 and probably no later than 2020. One of the most striking features of the story is that a powerful person is able to exert pressure on the news media to kill a story that at least one reporter is working on. The story would have generated enough publicity that in 1988 it would have been somewhat doubtful whether it could have been suppressed, but it would have been the kind of possibility that in 1988 I would have expected to generate some entertaining debates. But today, the idea that the reporter couldn’t advance her career by taking the story to an alternate news channel seems too foreign for even a moderately crazy conspiracy theorist to propose.
The book is not particularly bad as science fiction goes, but it’s full of places where I’m almost shocked at how primitive the flow of information seems. And when I think back, I remember that for more than half my life I lived in that primitive world.
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Book review: Human Accomplishment: The Pursuit of Excellence in the Arts and Sciences, 800 B.C. to 1950 by Charles Murray.
I was reluctant to read this book but read it because a reading group I belong to selected it. I agree with most of what it says, but was underwhelmed by what it accomplished.
He has compiled an impressive catalog of people who have accomplished excellent feats in arts, science, and technology.
He has a long section arguing that the disproportionate number of dead white males in his list is not a result of bias. Most of this just repeats what has been said many times before. He appears do have done more than most to check authorities of other cultures to verify that their perspective doesn’t conflict with his. But that’s hard to do well (how many different languages does he read well enough to avoid whatever selection biases influence what’s available in English?) and hard for me to verify. He doesn’t ask how his choice of categories (astronomy, medicine, etc) bias his results (I suspect not much).
His most surprising claim is that the rate of accomplishment is declining. He convinced me that he is measuring something that is in fact declining, but didn’t convince me that what he measured is important. I can think of many other ways of trying to measure accomplishment: number of lives saved, number of people whose accomplishment was bought by a million people, number of people whose accomplishment created $100 million in revenues, the Flynn Effect, number of patents, number of peer-reviewed papers, or number of meta–innovations. All of these measures have nontrivial drawbacks, but they illustrate why I find his measure (acclaim by scholars) very incomplete. An incomplete measure may be adequate for conclusions that aren’t very sensitive to the choice of measure (such as the male/female ratio of important people), but when most measures fail to support his conclusion that the rate of accomplishment is declining, his failure to try for a more inclusive measure is disappointing.
His research appears careful to a casual reader, but I found one claim that was definitely not well researched. He thinks that “the practice of medicine became an unambiguous net plus for the patient” around the 1920s or 1930s. He cites no sources for this claim, and if he had found the best studies on the subject he’d see lots of uncertainty about whether it has yet become a net plus.
Book review: Ending Aging: The Rejuvenation Breakthroughs That Could Reverse Human Aging in Our Lifetime by Aubrey de Grey and Michael Rae.
This book makes a strong argument that the most important medical need in developed countries is to cure the damage associated with aging, rather than to combat the diseases which become serious as a result of that damage. It outlines a set of solutions which, if they can be implemented, look like they would add at least a decade or two to healthy lifespans.
All of the solutions look like they have a reasonable chance of being implemented within 20 years. But the probability of all of them working within that time is a good deal lower than the probability of any one solution working, and there’s no obvious way to analyze whether we can get significant health benefits without implementing all of the solutions.
The authors seem somewhat overconfident about most aspects of their proposed solutions, but that doesn’t affect the substance if their arguments very much. Even a small chance of postponing death and disability is worth a good deal of effort.
The parts of the solutions that appear hardest are the ones that rely on techniques similar to what are already being attempted by mainstream scientists (genetic engineering to add and delete genes from most cells in the body, massive use of stem cells, and moving enzymes across the blood-brain barrier). My impressions about the effort that has been put into these techniques and the results that have been produced so far suggest that at least one of these is likely to take much longer than the book asks us to hope for. The book gives one clear example of important research not living up to the hype surrounding it when it gives arguments that most cancer research is directed toward modestly postponing cancer rather than providing a full solution to cancer. I see no obvious way for a layman to tell whether the authors are relying on similarly overhyped research.
So even though the book gives convincing arguments that the goals of medical research ought to be reframed to focus on aging as the primary threat to be solved, it’s far from conclusive about whether that should imply a large change in actual research. It may be that the hardest and most valuable tasks are the ones that are already being worked on. Or it may be that one of the critical tasks is sufficiently hard that the most important need is to invent tools that are substantially more sophisticated than what’s used in existing research (i.e. that we most need something more radical that what’s proposed in the book, such as nanomedicine).
This post is a response to a challenge on Overcoming Bias to spend $10 trillion sensibly.
Here’s my proposed allocation (spending to be spread out over 10-20 years):
- $5 trillion on drug patent buyouts and prizes for new drugs put in the public domain, with the prizes mostly allocated in proportion to the quality adjusted life years attributable to the drug.
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$1 trillion on establishing a few dozen separate clusters of seasteads and on facilitating migration of people from poor/oppressive countries by rewarding jurisdictions in proportion to the number of immigrants they accept from poorer / less free regions. (I’m guessing that most of those rewards will go to seasteads, many of which will be created by other people partly in hopes of getting some of these rewards).
This would also have a side affect of significantly reducing the harm that humans might experience due to global warming or an ice age, since ocean climates have less extreme temperatures, seasteads will probably not depend on rainfall to grow food, and can move somewhat to locations with better temperatures. - $1 trillion on improving political systems, mostly through prizes that bear some resemblance to The Mo Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership (but not limited to democratically elected leaders and not limited to Africa). If the top 100 or so politicians in about 100 countries are eligible, I could set the average reward at about $100 million per person. Of course, nowhere near all of them will qualify, so a fair amount will be left over for those not yet in office.
- $0.5 trillion on subsidizing trading on prediction markets that are designed to enable futarchy. This level of subsidy is far enough from anything that has been tried that there’s no way to guess whether this is a wasteful level.
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$1 trillion existential risks
Some unknown fraction of this would go to persuading people not to work on AGI without providing arguments that they will produce a safe goal system for any AI they create. Once I’m satisfied that the risks associated with AI are under control, much of the remaining money will go toward establishing societies in the asteroid belt and then outside the solar system. - $0.5 trillion on communications / computing hardware for everyone who can’t currently afford that.
- $1 trillion I’d save for ideas I think of later.
I’m not counting a bunch of other projects that would use up less than $100 billion since they’re small enough to fit in the rounding errors of the ones I’ve counted (the Methuselah Mouse prize, desalinization and other water purification technologies, developing nanotech, preparing for the risks of nanotech, uploading, cryonics, nature preserves, etc).
Book review: Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge by Cass R. Sunstein.
There’s a lot of overlap between James Surowiecki’s The Wisdom of Crowds and Infotopia, but Infotopia is a good deal more balanced and careful to avoid exaggeration. This makes Infotopia less exciting but more likely to convince a thoughtful reader. It devotes a good deal of attention to conditions which make groups less wise than individuals as well as conditions where groups outperform the best individuals.
Infotopia is directed at people who know little about this subject. I found hardly any new insights in it, and few ideas that I disagreed with. Some of its comments will seem too obvious to be worth mentioning to anyone who uses the web much. It’s slightly better than Wisdom of Crowds, but if you’ve already read Wisdom of Crowds you’ll get little out of Infotopia.
Book review: Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation by Joseph Henrich, Natalie Henrich.
This book provides a clear and informative summary of the evolutionary theories that explain why people cooperate (but few novel ideas), and some good but unexciting evidence that provides a bit of support for the theories.
One nice point they make is that unconditional altruism discourages cooperation – it’s important to have some sort of reciprocity (possibly indirect) for a society to prevent non-cooperators from outcompeting cooperators.
The one surprising fact uncovered in their field studies is that people are more generous in the Dictator Game than in the Ultimatum Game (games where one player decides how to divide money between himself and another player; in the Ultimatum Game the second player can reject the division, in which case neither gets anything). It appears that the Ultimatum Game encourages people to think in terms of business-like interactions, but in the Dictator Game a noncompetitive mode of thought dominates.
Book review: Reasonable Rx: Solving the Drug Price Crisis by Stan Finkelstein and Peter Temin.
This book provides a mediocre analysis of what is wrong with drug prices, and presents a solution that is probably a nontrivial improvement on the status quo, but isn’t the most thoughtful solution I’ve seen.
The most important complaint of the book boils down to the fact that knowledge about drug safety and effectiveness is a public good, and the current method of rewarding drug companies for producing that knowledge is mediocre (although the book presents it less clearly than that and seems as interested in blaming drug companies’ lack of altruism as it is in analyzing the incentives).
For example, it is sometimes possible to identify biomarkers which indicate that a drug will be ineffective in a patient, but that would often reduce sales of the drug.
They complain that the current focus on producing a few very profitable drugs is an obstacle to creating personalized treatments. But they do little more than imply that drug companies are misjudging the available opportunities, without presenting any clear evidence that the authors’ have better judgment about what’s feasible.
Their proposed changes to the drug industry involve separating drug development and drug marketing/manufacturing into two different sets of companies, and using a combination of subsidies and contractual price controls (negotiated by a government sponsored nonprofit) to lower the prices of drugs.
They didn’t convince me that splitting drug companies will produce any significant benefits, although I also don’t see it producing harm.
The subsidies and price controls are likely to help mitigate some of the problems created by the patent system. Their attempts to show that this solution is better than Kremer’s patent buyout proposal suggest they don’t understand how much harm patent monopolies cause. Their subsidy mechanism isn’t clearly tied to benefits (unlike proposals for prizes based on Quality Adjusted Life Years). They claim drug prize proposals set arbitrary values for drugs and that their auction system produces a less arbitrary market price, but the subsidy part of their part of their system is at least as arbitrary, and their market based prices reflect the value of an arbitrary patent duration.
Their claim that Medicare savings will pay for their subsidies seems deceptive. When estimating the Medicare savings, they appear to rely on an assumption that prices of existing drugs will drop by a large amount. Yet when estimating the subsidy costs, they appear to count only the costs of subsidizing newly introduced drugs.
They are too quick to complain about drug companies medicalizing conditions that are mere inconveniences. E.g. they say Flomax does nothing more important than reduce sleep disturbances. This ignores the evidence that sleep disturbances cause significant health problems.
The chapter “Are Drug Companies Risky?” is pointless because it only evaluates the most successful companies (i.e. those whose gambles have already paid off).
I have long been dissatisfied with the attempts I’ve seen to explain why evolution hasn’t made homosexuality rare.
A new paper in PLoS ONE: Sexually Antagonistic Selection in Human Male Homosexuality presents a model that seems adequate.
The main idea (from this summary) is that
a heightened sexual response to men could make women more likely to pass on their genes, while making men possessing the trait less likely to do so.
The paper notes this evidence to support it:
homosexuals’ mothers are more fecund than mothers of heterosexuals. Further female fecundity asymmetries include a higher fecundity of maternal vs. paternal aunts of homosexuals
This model provides hints about why homosexuality is not rare among other species.
My main reservation is that the model leads me to expect bisexuality to be somewhat more likely than homosexuality.
Cultural Difference
From a book called Apples are from Kazakhstan, a conversation in which the author reacts to a trendy Almaty restaurant’s nostalgic depiction of Lenin and Stalin:
“It’s inconceivable to think of a Nazi beer cellar in Berlin hung with swastikas, with the waiters dressed up as SS officers handing out postcards of Goebbels, and a bust of ‘Uncle Adolf’ in the corner.”
“They don’t have a place like that?” my friend asked
Book review: Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism by Ha-Joon Chang.
This book attacks orthodoxies of the World Bank, IMF, WTO, neo-liberal economists, free-market economists, and pundits such as Thomas Friedman. Chang often implies that they all share a common orthodoxy, but the ideas he attacks are usually questioned by some of those groups.
His criticisms of the World Bank, IMF, and WTO are often correct, but it shouldn’t be surprising that they serve goals that don’t coincide with needs of developing countries.
His most important argument is a defense of mercantilist protection of infant industries. He shows that the evidence on the effects of tariffs is sufficiently mixed that his selective use of examples can give the impression that he has shown tariffs promote economic growth in developing countries. He makes claims of the form “X would have failed without protection”, but doesn’t say why his ability to predict failure is more reliable than other alleged experts (e.g. MITI’s belief that Honda would fail in the auto business). This provoked me into searching for more complete tests of the effects of tariffs. The evidence I found confirms that his confidence that tariffs work is foolish, but I was surprised to find that the evidence is too unclear to provide a guide to policy decision.
Chang has a good argument that the common orthodoxy about comparative advantage is a less conclusive reason for removing tariffs than it appears. But his attempts to describe a mechanism by which tariffs can be beneficial are naive. He talks about government protecting infant industries the way a parent protects a child, without any analysis of the political forces which cause governments to protect entrenched declining industries at the expense of less politically powerful startups.
He gives only vague hints about how to distinguish the tariffs he thinks are good from bad tariffs. I’ll offer a suggestion: any tariff that is designed to meet his notion of a good tariff should be set by statute to decrease to zero over a period of about a decade and never be reinstated for an industry to which they’ve been applied under this statute.
His complaints about privatizing state-owned enterprises contain some valid points. I wish people didn’t assume government and stockholder control are the only available choices. Having governments spin off enterprises as nonprofits would sometimes (often?) be a better option.
His comments about how patents and copyright affect developing countries are mostly correct. But he underestimates our dependence on drug patents when he implies that the 57% of drug research funding that comes from not-for-profit sources means we could get 57% of the results without commercial funding. A drug startup that will go broke if it doesn’t produce something valuable does different work than someone whose success comes from publishing papers.
Chang’s modest suggestions for patent reform would provide much less improvement than ideas I’ve found by reading free-market economists (e.g. prizes instead of patents, or Kremer’s patent buyout proposal).
His comments about inflation assume that it produces some benefits, but he shows no awareness of the economic literature which disputes that assumption.
He has plausible hypotheses that increasing market forces might cause an increase in corruption in some countries. I see no easy way to estimate the size of these effects.
His arguments that cultures change in response to economic change more than most people realize are strong enough to lower my opinion of Fukuyama’s book Trust (Fukuyama seems unaware that the German current high-trust culture is very different from a century ago when they had a reputation for dishonesty). But Chang exaggerates a lot when he says immigrants from poor countries working much harder in rich countries proves that work habits result from economic conditions rather than culture – those immigrants are unlikely to be typical of the culture they came from.