Book review: Finding Alpha: The Search for Alpha When Risk and Return Break Down by Eric Falkenstein.

This book presents mostly convincing arguments that refute the basic principle of CAPM that riskier investments are rewarded with higher returns, and the relation between risk and returns is better explained by modeling investors as wanting high returns relative to other investors rather than high absolute returns. But the quality of the arguments is quite variable. Much of the book assumes a good understanding of finance theory. If you don’t understand the importance of a Sharpe ratio, you’re not in his target audience.

I was not convinced by his most heavily emphasized empirical claim, that returns on equities are unrelated to beta because controlling for size eliminates the apparent relation. There’s enough connection between size and risk that this raises many questions he doesn’t answer (e.g. JB Berk, A critique of size-related anomalies). But later on he devotes a chapter to a wide variety of evidence that overcomes these concerns, and somewhat supports his claim that for riskier investments, the correlation between risk and return is negative (for the safest investments, it’s positive). And the authoritative Fama and French paper has more convincing evidence about beta – even without controlling for size, the correlation between beta and returns vanished during the 1963 to 1990 period.

He claims that the equity risk premium is effectively zero for a typical investor. His attempt to add up the different adjustments is confusing. He concludes with a table showing size adjustments to that standard estimate that add up to a mind-boggling 15 percent, which would result in a “premium” of -9 percent or so. But adding them is clearly wrong – the tax adjustment assumes the absence of some of the other adjustments. Still, the arguments he assembles from other researchers imply a good chance that the sign of the equity risk premium varies with the time period over which it’s measured.

He suggests some strategies to invest more wisely as a result of the ideas he presents, which he aptly summarizes as “selling hope relative to the market” (i.e. treating volatile stocks as overpriced due to a hope premium). But claiming this produces “superior returns, with less risk however measured” is too strong. Financial risk is not the only relevant measure of risk. Following his advice has social risks that he hints at elsewhere. Being invested in boring stocks in a bubble impairs your ability to engage in some interesting conversations, and you won’t make up for that by mentioning how you outperform the market in times when other want to avoid remembering their investments. Is it possible to minimize both kinds of risks by investing token amounts in ways that trendy folks are talking about, and investing most of your money to maximize your Sharpe ratio? Or does that require too much cognitive dissonance?

The book encourages pessimism, especially about the effects of people wanting relative wealth, and makes disturbing claims such as “Envy is necessary for compassion”.

He provides a number of other good ideas about investing, such as the possibility that the internet bubble adds a big anomaly to many data sets used for backtesting.

Book review: Outliers: The Story of Success by Malcolm Gladwell.

Gladwell has taken what would be a few ordinary blog posts and added enough eloquent fluff to them to make them into a book. There is probably a good deal of truth to his conclusions, but the evidence is much weaker than he wants you to think.

For his claim that 10,000 hours of practice are needed to become an expert, he doesn’t discuss the possibility that the causality often runs the opposite way: having the talent to become an expert creates a desire to practice a lot. He gives at least one example where the person seemed to lack expertise before getting the 10,000 hours of practice, but it’s not hard to imagine a variety of immaturity-related reasons why that might happen without the amount of practice causing the expertise.

I’m confused by his claims about how much practice he thinks the Beatles had before becoming successful. He points to somewhere between 1,200 and 1,800 hours of practice they had by late 1962 (which is about when Wikipedia indicates they became successful in the UK). Gladwell seems to say they weren’t successful until they came to the US in February 1964. He implies that they had 10,000 hours of practice by then, but I don’t see how he could claim they had much more than 3,000 hours of practice by then. So calling the 10,000 hour estimate a rule appears involve a good deal of exaggeration.

Book review: Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State by Yasheng Huang.

This is the most insightful book I’ve read so far on the Chinese economy. Most commentators only look at the most readily available data, but Huang dug through many obscure detailed records that were less likely to be manipulated.

The most important point of the book is to show that the widely held view of China as having gradual, steady improvement since 1978 is wrong. There was a dramatic political change in 1978 that allowed the rural parts of China (which still account for a large part of the economy, and where entrepreneurial culture had not been stamped out by communism) to prosper. Then starting in 1989 urban-focused leaders stifled rural businesses, causing stagnation there until 2002, when leaders more friendly to rural business gained power and allowed fairly healthy growth to resume.

Meanwhile urban areas have been dominated by crony capitalism which produced a good deal of gdp growth through massive state-directed investment in large companies, especially in the 1990s. This growth has produced fewer benefits to the average person than gdp numbers would lead us to expect.

Most of China’s success has been due to private enterprise. Beliefs that state-run businesses have produced growth are partly due to confusing reports about which companies are private.

I’m fairly impressed by the documentation of the changes in the rural political climate, but since the author seems to be the only one reading his sources of data and since it would be very time consuming to check them, it would be easy for errors to go unnoticed. For urban issues, he appears to be overstating the importance of problems that are not unique to China.

He partly clears up the puzzle of China doing better than should be expected for a country whose legal system doesn’t provide much rule of law. He provides evidence that some of the most important successes depend on British law imported via Hong Kong. But he doesn’t provide enough evidence to tell us how important this effect has been.

He leaves unanswered many questions I’d like answered. Why did government policies undergo these changes? Is the surprisingly reported steady gdp growth mostly the result of manipulated statistics? How much of the growth has been an investment bubble, and how much is sustainable? How did entrepreneurial culture survive communism in rural China so much better than in other countries?

How can a hospital-like business operating outside of existing territorial jurisdictions avoid harrassment by governments whose medical lobbies want to spread FUD?

Given that these businesses will initially have no track record to point to and less protection than existing medical tourism providers from whatever government provides a flag of convenience to the business, merely providing comparable quality medical care won’t be enough for such businesses to thrive. So I’m proposing practices which could enable those businesses to argue that current U.S. hospitals are more dangerous. I’m not suggesting this just for marketing purposes – I want safe hospitals to be available, and regulatory costs in the U.S. make it easier to start an innovative hospital offshore than in the U.S. (especially for types of innovation that don’t respect doctors’ prestige).

It has been known since 1847 that doctors kill patients by failing to wash their hands often enough. Yet this threat is still common. An offshore hospital could offer patients documentation showing when medical personel who touch the patient washed their hands (e.g. by providing the patient with video recordings of the procedures sufficient for the patient to verify cleanliness), with a double your money back guarantee. There are many other less common errors that patients could use such videos to check for.

The book Counting Sheep argues that hospitals often impair patients’ health by disturbing their sleep. Paying patients if night-time noise or light levels exceed some pre-specified limits should reduce this problem.

Next, I want the hospital’s fee structure to give it increased incentives to avoid failure. For procedures with objectively measurable results, I want the hospital to charge the patient only if those results are achieved, and to pay the patient some pre-specified amount if results leave the patient measurably worse off. (For hard to measure results such as change in pain, this approach won’t work).

The article You Get What You Pay For: Result-Based Compensation for Health Care has more extensive discussion of incentives and of strategies that hospitals might use to reduce the rate at which they harm patients.

I once proposed using life expectancy as the primary indicator of what society should try to maximize.

Recently there have been reports that life expectancy is negatively correlated with standard measures of economic growth. I accept the conclusion that depressions and recessions are less harmful than is commonly believed, but I want to point out the dangers of looking at only the life expectancy in the same year as an event that influences life expectancy. Depressions may have harmful effects that take a decade to show up in life expectancy figures (e.g. long-term wealth effects, effects on willingness to wage war, etc). So I’d like to see how life expectancy averaged over the ensuing 10 or 15 years correlates with a year’s gdp change.

I attended about 2/3 of the recent Seasteading conference. There were plenty of interesting people there. But I became less optimistic that seasteading will be implemented within the next decade.

The most discouraging news was that floating breakwaters probably won’t work with using propulsion to control location. They might work if anchored (which needs shallow water that only provides a little usable area outside territorial waters), and should still work with seasteads that drift were the currents take them (only suitable for people comfortable with being isolated).

The medical tourism ship business idea had last year seemed the most promising stepping stone on the way to seasteading. This year’s talk by Na’ama Moran on that subject provided better talking points that might be used to interest investors, but had nothing resembling a business plan. A year ago there was some hope that moderate changes to SurgiCruise‘s business plan could turn it into something viable. The seasteaders who were involved in that gave up on working with SurgiCruise recently, and no progress appears to have been made yet on creating an alternative.

I was also disappointed that she described no plans for dealing with the U.S. medical establishment’s ability to smear competitors. A company with no track record and weak regulation by, say, Panama can be made to sound dangerous to patients even if it provides care as good as U.S. hospitals. Could a medical cruise company hope to get accreditation early enough? There are large uncertainties about how much that costs and how soon it would be needed. I want a medical tourism company to prepare to demonstrate ways in which it provides higher quality care than U.S. hospitals (more on this in a later post).

Kevin Overman presented a vaguely promising idea for using RepRap and products from algae to build (print) structures at a cost that he hopes will be an order of magnitude less than with the materials currently envisioned to build a seastead. If he’s right, he should be able to make a nice profit building things on land before anyone is ready to build a seastead. The one drawback that I noticed is that it requires thicker structures (2X?) to get the same strength.

I also stopped by Ephemerisle for Saturday afternoon. It shows some promise as a competitor to Burning Man, but it’s unclear whether anything people learned there is related to skills needed to hold a festival in international waters. Possibly the design of the main platform can be adapted to the ocean without radical changes, but virtually all the other activity was done without any apparent regard for whether it could be repeated in the ocean.

Some of Robin Hanson’s Malthusian-sounding posts prompted me to wonder how we can create a future that is better than the repugnant conclusion. It struck me that there’s no reason to accept the assumption that increasing the number of living minds to the limit of available resources implies that the quality of the lives those minds live will decrease to where they’re barely worth living.

If we imagine the minds to be software, then a mind that barely has enough resources to live could be designed so that it is very happy with the cpu cycles or negentropy it gets even if those are negligible compared to other minds. Or if there is some need for life to be biological, a variant of hibernation might accomplish the same result.

If this is possible, then what I find repugnant about the repugnant conclusion is that it perpetuates the cruelty of evolution which produces suffering in beings with fewer resources than they were evolved to use. Any respectable civilization will engineer away the conflict between average utilitarianism and total utilitarianism.

If instead the most important limit on the number of minds is the supply of matter, then there is a tradeoff between more minds and more atoms per mind. But there is no mere addition paradox to create concerns about a repugnant conclusion if the creation of new minds reduces the utility of other minds.

(Douglas W. Portmore has a similar but less ambitious conclusion (pdf)).

Book review: Meltdown: A Free-Market Look at Why the Stock Market Collapsed, the Economy Tanked, and Government Bailouts Will Make Things Worse by Thomas E. Woods Jr.

This book describes the Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT) in a more readable form than it’s usually presented. Its basic idea that malinvestment creates business cycles, and that central bank manipulation of interest rates can cause malinvestment, is correct. But when Woods tries to argue that only errors by a government can cause business cycles, his ideological blinders become obvious. He’s mostly right when he complains about government mistakes, and mostly wrong when he denies the existence of other problems.

He asks why businesses made a “cluster of errors” that added up to a big problem rather than independent errors which mostly canceled each other out. The only answer he can find is misleading signals sent by the Fed’s manipulation of interest rates. He doesn’t explain why businessmen fail to learn from the frequent and widely publicized patterns of those Fed actions. It’s unclear why groupthink needs a strong cause, but one obvious possibility that Woods ignores is that most people saw a persistent trend of rising housing prices, and didn’t remember large drops in housing prices over a region as large as the U.S.

He shows no understanding of the problems associated with sticky wages which are a key part of the better arguments for Keynesian approaches.

He wants to credit ABCT with having predicted this downturn. If you try to figure out when was the last time it didn’t predict a downturn (the early 1920s?), this seems less impressive than, say, Robert Shiller’s track record for predicting when bubbles burst.

His somewhat selective use of historical evidence carefully avoids anything that might present a picture more complex than government being the sole villain. He describes enough U.S. economic expansions to present a clear case that credit expansion contributed to the ensuing bust, and usually points to a government activity which one can imagine caused excessive credit expansion. But he’s unusually vague about the causes of the expansion that led to the panic of 1857. Could that be because he wants to overlook the role that new gold mining in California played in that inflationary cycle?

He mostly denies that free market approaches have been tested for long enough to see whether we would avoid business cycles under a true free market. He points to a few downturns when he says the government followed a wise laissez faire policy, and compares the shortness of those downturns with a few longer downturns where the government made some attempts to solve the downturns. When doing this, he avoids mention of the downturns where massive government actions were followed by mild recessions. Any complete survey comparing the extent of government action with the ensuing economic conditions would provide a much murkier picture of the relative contributions of government and market error than Woods is willing to allow.

The most interesting claim that I hadn’t previously heard is that a large decrease in the money supply in 1839-1843 coincided with healthy GNP growth, which, if true, is hard to explain without assuming Keynesian and monetarist theories explain a relatively small fraction of business cycle problems. My attempts to check this yielded a report at http://www.measuringworth.org/usgdp/ saying GDP in 2005 dollars rose from $31.37 in 1839 to $34.84 in 1843, but GDP per capita in 2005 dollars dropped from $1884 in 1839 to $1869 in 1843. Declining GDP per capita doesn’t sound very prosperous to me (although it’s a mild enough decline to provide little support for Keynesians/monetarists).

He tries to blame the “mistakes” of credit rating agencies on an SEC-created cartel of rating agencies. That “cartel” does have some special privileges, but he doesn’t say what stops bloggers from expressing opinions on bond risks and developing reputations that lead to investors using those opinions in addition to the “cartel”‘s ratings (Freerisk is a project which is planning a sophisticated alternative). I say that anyone who understands markets would expect the yield on the bonds to provide as good an estimate of risk as any alternative. Credit rating agencies must be performing some other function in order to thrive. An obvious function is to mislead bosses and/or regulators who don’t understand markets into thinking that the people making investment decisions are making choices that are safer than they actually are. It appears that the agencies performed that function well, and helped many people avoid being fired for poor choices.

His discussion of whether WWII spending cured the Great Depression points out that mainstream theories falsely predicted a return to depression in 1946. But it’s unclear whether all versions of Keynesianism make that mistake, and it’s unclear how ABCT could predict the U.S. would be much more prosperous in 1946 than at the start of the war.
Here’s an alternative explanation that lies in between those theories: wages were being kept too high for supply and demand to balance through 1941. Inflation and changes in government policy toward wage levels during WW2 eliminated the causes of that imbalance.

Arnold Kling has a good quasi-Austrian alternative here and here.

Book review: The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008 by Paul Krugman.

Large parts of this book accurately describe some processes which contribute to financial crises, but he fails to describe enough of what happened in crises such as in 2008 to reach sensible policy advice.

He presents a simple example of a baby-sitting co-op that experienced a recession via a Keynesian liquidity trap, and he is right to believe that is part of what causes recessions, but he doesn’t have much of an argument that other causes are unimportant.

His neglect of malinvestment problems contributes to his delusion that central banks reach limits to their power in crises where interest rates approach zero. The presence or absence of deflation seems to provide a fairly good estimate of whether liquidity trap type problems exist. If you recognize that malinvestments are part of the problem that caused crises such as that of 2008, the natural conclusion is that the Fed solved most of the liquidity trap type problem within a few months of noticing the severity of the downturn. There is ample reason to suspect that the economy is suffering from a misallocation of resources, such as workers who developed skills as construction workers when perfect foresight would have told them to develop skill in careers where demand is expanding (nurses?). Nobody knows how to instantly convert those workers into appropriate careers, so we shouldn’t expect a quick fix to the problems associated with that malinvestment. It appears possible for he Fed to make that malinvestment have been successful investment by dropping enough dollars from helicopters to create an inflation rate that will make home buying attractive again. Krugman’s suggested fiscal stimulus looks almost as poor a solution as that to anyone who sees malinvestment as the main remaining problem.

His claim that central bank policy is ineffective is misleading because he pretends that controlling interest rates is all that central banks do to “stimulate” the economy. If instead you focus on changes in the money supply (which central banks can sometimes cause with little effect on interest rates), you’ll see they have plenty of power to inflate.

He dismisses the problem of sticky wages as if it were minor or inevitable. But if you understand the role that plays in unemployment, and analyze Singapore’s policy of automatically altering payroll taxes to stabilize jobs, you should see that’s more cost-effective than the fiscal stimulus Krugman wants.

I’m not satisfied with his phrasing of lack of “effective demand” being caused by people “trying to accumulate cash”. If we apply standard financial terminology to changes the value of a currency (e.g. saying that there’s a speculative bubble driving up the value of the currency, or that there’s a short squeeze – highly leveraged firms have what amounts to a big short position in dollars), then it seems more natural to use the intuitions we’ve developed for the stock market to fluctuations in currency values.

He doesn’t adequately explain why most economists don’t want a global currency. He says labor mobility within the area that standardizes on a currency is important for it to work well. I’m unconvinced that much mobility is needed for a global currency to work better than the mediocre alternatives, but even if it is, I’d expect economists to advocate a combination of a global currency and reducing the barriers to mobility. How much of economists dislike for a global currency is due to real harm from regional fluctuations and how much is it due to politicians rewarding people like Krugman for biasing their arguments in ways that empower the politicians? Or do they not give it much thought because they’ve decided it’s politically infeasible even if desirable?

His description of the shadow banking system clarifies quite well how regulatory efforts to avoid crises failed. His solution of regulating like a bank anything that acts like a bank would work well if implemented by an altruistic government. But his “simple rule” is too vague for his intent to survive in a system where politicians want to bend the rules to help their friends.