Social Security was created based on the premise that people of certain ages are unable to support themselves due to poor and declining health. Yet Aubrey de Grey has made a fairly strong argument that this bad health can be cured (see Strategies for Engineered Negligible Senescence), so that the elderly will be as healthy as the young.
Since it’s probably inevitable that the government will end up paying for the initial round of anti-aging treatments, why not make government payments for such treatments conditional on the beneficiary leaving the Social Security system? This would probably save the government enough that it would be worthwhile for it to speed the research up by offering a few billion dollars in prizes for people who complete milestones such as extending the lifespans of lab animals.
There’s a good deal of doubt as to how many decades it will take to produce a good enough cure (and some ambiguity as to how good a cure would need to be to qualify). But the a combination of Aubrey de Grey’s arguments and those of Rob Freitas and Eric Drexler suggest that there’s a very good chance that it can be done before Social Security is expected to collapse. And anyone who thinks Congress might turn Social Security into a system that is certain to remain solvent is drastically overestimating the reliability of demographic forecasts and/or the far-sightedness of Congress.
Politics
I’m curious how U.S. politicians are rationalizing their support for tariffs to punish China for keeping the yuan high (i.e. propping up the dollar). There’s an obvious alternative if it’s as clear as most people claim that the yuan is undervalued: have the U.S. government buy as many yuan as it can. That would make it more expensive for China to keep the yuan down at a probable profit to the U.S.
There may be some Chinese rules which pose obstacles to doing this, but I doubt the U.S. politicians are able to know that they couldn’t get around such rules.
Note that I didn’t ask what their real motives are (tariffs benefit special interests more than buying the yuan would, which provides a strong hint). I’m interested in what excuses they would give.
In the latest issue of Econ Journal Watch, Bryan Caplan and Donald Wittman hold an inconclusive debate on whether democracy produces results that are sensibly related to voters’ interests. They come much closer than most such discussions to using the right criteria for answering that question.
But they fail because they implicitly assume that inaccuracies in voters’ beliefs are random mistakes. If that were the case, Wittman’s replies to Caplan would convince me that Caplan’s evidence of voter irrationality is as weak as the arguments that consumer irrationality prevents markets from working, and that Wittman’s proposed experiments might tell us a good deal about how well democracy works.
On the other hand, if you ask whether voters have incentives to hold beliefs that differ from the truth in nonrandom ways, you will see a fairly strong argument that voters’ inadequate incentive to hold accurate beliefs causes systematic problems with democracy.
Imagine that you live near a steel mill. This means that believing that steel import restrictions are bad will increase the risk that your acquaintances will dislike you (because you views endanger their jobs or their friends’ jobs), and will probably bias you toward supporting protectionism.
Or take the issue of how gun control affects crime rates. There are some obvious patterns of beliefs about this which the random-mistake hypothesis fails to predict. Whereas the theory that people adopt beliefs in order to indicate that they think like their friends and neighbors (combined with some regional variations in gun ownership that created some bias before people started thinking about the issue) does a much better job of predicting the observed patterns of belief.
Because this seems to be a widespread problem with democracy, I’m fairly certain democracy works poorly compared to markets and compared to forms of government such as Futarchy which improve the incentives for policies to be based on accurate beliefs.
This report from Afghanistan suggests that the situation there has changed enough in the past year to cast a lot of doubt on the claims made in the book Imperial Hubris that I reported a few months ago.
The cover describes Stratfor (the intelligence company Friedman founded) as a “Shadow CIA”. By this book’s description of the CIA, this implies it has a lot of details right but misses many important broad trends. The book tends to have weaknesses of this nature, being better as a history of Al Qaeda’s conflict with the U.S. than as a guide to the future, but it’s probably a good deal more reliable than CIA analysis.
It describes a few important trends that I wasn’t aware of. The best theory the book proposes that I hadn’t heard before is the claim that the U.S. government is much more worried about Al Qaeda getting a nuclear bomb than the public realizes (for instance, the Axis of Evil is the set of nations that are unable or unwilling to prove they won’t help Al Qaeda get the bomb).
The explanation of the U.S. motives for invading Iraq as primarily to pressure the Saudi government is unconvincing.
The book’s biases are sufficiently subtle that I have some difficulty detecting them. It often paints Bush in as favorable a light as possible, but is also filled with some harsh criticisms of his mistakes, for example:
It is an extraordinary fact that in the U.S.-jihadist war, the only senior commander or responsible civilian to have been effectively relieved was Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, who was retired unceremoniously (although not ahead of schedule) after he accurately stated that more than 200,000 troops would be needed in Iraq
The person selected, Tom Ridge, had no background in the field and had absolutely no idea what he was doing, but that was not a problem problem since, in fact, he would have nothing really to do. His job was simply to appear to be in control of an apparatus that did not yet exist
But it’s hard to place a lot of confidence in theories that are backed mainly by eloquent stories. It’s unfortunate that the book is unable or unwilling to document the evidence needed to confirm them.
There’s a fair amount of agreement between this book and Imperial Hubris, but I’ve revised my opinion of that book a bit due to the disagreements between the two. The claims by Imperial Hubris that we don’t need to worry about a new Caliphate seem unpersuasive now that I see there widespread disagreement with that claim and weak arguments on both sides. The two books disagree on who’s currently winning the war, but I see no sign that defeat for either side is anywhere near close enough to be predictable.
Secretary of State Rice said on yesterday’s Face the Nation:
I’m quite certain that all Iraqis want to defeat this insurgency and get on with building a democratic Iraq.
I’m curious as to who she wants us to think make up this “insurgency”, if it isn’t Muslim jihadists, many of whom happen to be Iraqis. If they were all coming from outside Iraq’s borders, wouldn’t the administration be putting more effort into sealing the borders than in fighting them in cities?
Last week’s issue of Nature has a review of a recent Michael Crichton book (dismissed as “Viagra for climate sceptics”) which contains an interesting claim about the reaction to the movie The Day After Tomorrow:
Surveys of public opinion conducted before and after the film was released found that it made people think climate change is less likely
Apparently its obvious lack of realism caused people to associate the more respectable claims about global warming with Hollywood escapism.
I wonder if this is the tip of a much larger iceberg. It seems to me that a wide variety of political movements tend to promote the most alarmist versions of their ideas in order to get respect and/or money from their strongest supporters. I don’t find it hard to imagine that it is common for activist groups to hurt the causes they claim to be fighting for by sounding unrealistic to swing voters.
In today’s press conference, someone asked Bush about how the turnout in the Iraqi elections would affect their legitimacy. The questioner seemed think that a very high turnout (such as elections in the Soviet Union produced) would make the results legitimate, but low turnout (such as typical local elections here in Silicon Valley produce?) would raise questions about the election’s legitimacy. Why do suggestions such as that not produce ridicule? Is it due to a preference for easily quantified criteria?
A few minutes later, Bush took great care to avoid supporting free speech for Muslims who hate the U.S (he was asked about Jordan, but could easily have talked about other parts of the mideast). This hints at a willingness to prevent jihadists who seem to have support from a nontrivial fraction of the Iraqi population from campaigning, which might lend some plausibility to their boycott of the elections.
Another issue that is important in determining whether the elections are legitimate is whether there is any reason for one part of Iraq to be subject to the ideology of the majority within Iraq. Iraq is hardly a nation in the normal sense of that word – it contains several cultures, not fond of the idea of nation-states, who were made into a country by British decree.
If I had somehow become U.S. president around the time that Saddam was captured, I would have dispensed with recreating a national Iraqi government, and simply held hasty elections for ruling councils in each town/city, then I would have withdrawn U.S. troops.
Book Review: Catastrophe: Risk And Response by Richard A. Posner
This book does a very good job of arguing that humans are doing an inadequate job of minimizing the expected harm associated with improbable but major disasters such as asteroid strikes and sudden climate changes. He provides a rather thorough and unbiased summary of civilization-threatening risks, and a good set of references to the relevant literature.
I am disappointed that he gave little attention to the risks of AI. Probably his reason is that his expertise in law and economics will do little to address what is more of an engineering problem that is unlikely to be solved by better laws.
I suspect he’s overly concerned about biodiversity loss. He tries to justify his concern by noting risks to our food chain that seem to depend on our food supply being less diverse than it is.
His solutions do little to fix the bad incentives which have prevented adequate preparations. The closest he comes to fixing them is his proposal for a center for catastrophic-risk assessment and response, which would presumably have some incentive to convince people of risks in order to justify its existence.
His criticisms of information markets (aka idea futures) ignore the best arguments on this subject. He attacks the straw man of using them to predict particular terrorist attacks, and ignores possibilities such as using them to predict whether invading Iraq would reduce or increase deaths due to terrorism over many years. And his claim that scientists need no monetary incentives naively ignores their bias to dismiss concerns about harm resulting from their research (bias which he notes elsewhere as a cause of recklessness). See Robin Hanson’s Idea Futures web pages for arguments suggesting that this is a major mistake on Posner’s part.
Continue Reading
Posner makes some good arguments against foreign aid, but his implication that the U.S. should do nothing to make AIDS treatments available to backward countries is misleading. Much of the cost of the treatments is the R and D cost of designing the drugs rather than the marginal cost of additional doses. The patent buyout scheme proposed by Michael Kremer (see the book Entrepreneurial Economics) provides a way to significantly reduce those costs, while probably benefiting wealthy countries. A government or charity would buy many patents and put them in the public domain. The price would be set by auctions which would be kept honest by sometimes selling the patent to bidders instead of making the patent free. Ideally the price would be a bit higher than the private value of the patents, to reflect the fact that the social benefits exceed the value that the patentholder would get from enforcing the patent, resulting in improved incentives for drug development and in the drugs being available to people who can’t afford the patent holders’ prices. The most likely downside is the cost associated with using taxes to finance the buyouts (can someone show that private charity would be able to handle this?).
It is unclear whether the simpler approach of making exceptions to patent laws for backward countries would work well. It would depend on how hard it is to smuggle drugs from those countries to wealthy countries (which would harm the incentives to develop new drugs).