Arnold Kling reports that free markets are more popular in China than in the U.S.
That reminds me that I should give more thought to investing in China-related companies.
Economics
Book Review: The Armchair Economist: Economics And Everyday Experience by Steven Landsburg
This short and eloquent book does a mostly excellent job of explaining to non-economists how economic reasoning works in a wide variety of mostly non-financial areas. But it’s frustrating how he can get so much right but still demonstrate many annoying oversimplifications that economists’ biases make them prone to.
For example, on page 145 he claims that a trash collection company could cheaply prohibit Styrofoam peanuts in the trash by checking everyone’s trash once a year and fining violators $100,000. But anyone who thinks about the economics of such fines will be able to imagine massive costs from people disputing who is responsible for peanuts in the trash. Maybe there are cultures in which such fines would ensure negligible violations, but there are probably as many cultures in which disputes over people putting peanuts in someone else’s trash cans would produce more waste than the peanuts do.
His suggestion of applying antitrust laws to politicians is almost right, but ignores the public choice problems of ensuring that laws marketed as antitrust laws do anything to prevent monopoly. The details of antitrust laws are complex and boring enough that few people other than special interests pay attention to them, so special interests are able to twist the details to turn the laws into forces that protect monopolies.
On page 183 he says “Flood the economy with money and the nominal interest rate goes up in lockstep with inflation”. Given a sufficiently long-term perspective, this is an arguably decent approximation. But he’s disputing the common sense of a typical reporter who is more interested in a short-term perspective under which those changes clearly do not happen in lockstep (on page 216 he provides hints at a theory of why there’s a delayed reaction).
He makes some good points about the similarities between environmentalism and religion, but it seems these points blind him to non-religious motives behind environmentalism. He says on page 227 about relocating polluting industries: “To most economists, this is a self-evident opportunity to make not just Americans but everybody better off.” Maybe if he included a payoff to the U.S. workers whose jobs went overseas, this conclusion would be plausible. But it’s hard enough to figure out how such a payoff should be determined that I suspect he simply ignored that problem.
Arnold Kling writes some interesting comments about the uses of oil futures markets.
I recall reading that the President of Exxon was forecasting oil prices much lower than the futures markets and thinking that if he believes his own forecast, then he should put his company up for sale.
I think there’s a genuine inconsistency between Exxon’s talk and its actions, but selling the company isn’t the optimum response. We don’t know that Exxon’s stock price currently reflects the prices forecast by the futures market (I decided 6 months ago that energy-related companies were underpriced relative to the futures market and sold my last 2009 futures contract while keeping a large position in energy-related companies) or that the market for large oil companies is liquid enough for Exxon to be sold at a good price. It makes more sense for Exxon to hedge larger fractions of its production by selling more futures contracts.
Maybe the long-date futures markets are illiquid enough that prices would approach what Exxon’s president thinks they should be, in which case Exxon would make slightly more money than under its current policies (assuming the resulting prices are right, which Exxon ought to assume is the best available guess). Or maybe the markets have enough liquidity that Exxon would hedge a large fraction of its production at prices near $60/barrel, which would help Exxon dramatically if Exxon’s president is right, and forgo big profits if he’s wrong. It’s fairly clear the market doesn’t have the liquidity to keep long-dated futures prices over $60/barrel if Exxon tries to make big hedges overnight, but if Exxon were fairly patient about building up the hedge positions, I don’t think we can know what would happen without performing the experiment. There are lots of people out there who think that betting against Exxon would be a good deal. Their confidence in their beliefs remains untested.
The government has all sorts of subsidies for alternative energy. However, the most efficient subsidy would be to buy oil futures contracts. If we must have an energy policy, it should consist solely of strategic futures market purchases.
Buying oil futures contracts would be the least wasteful way to subsidize the solar energy market, where there are many designs that are close to providing competitive mass-produced products. But financial markets are pouring enough money into that market that there’s little reason to think government subsidies are valuable.
Buying oil futures won’t provide the kind of subsidy that, say, fusion advocates would want. If markets are inadequately funding fusion research and government is benevolent enough to do better (a suspicious pair of assumptions, but without assumptions of that nature the popular demand for a government energy policy is a mistake), then oil futures markets won’t solve the problem because the problem is something like markets having inadequate information to target the right research or patents not providing inventors with the optimum fraction of the social benefits of their inventions.
Last week in a ski lift line I overheard a college-aged guy bragging about how he was making money in the Florida housing market before going to college.
This kind of anecdotal evidence is not as reliable as I would like, but market bubbles rarely have conclusive evidence, so I feel a need to make use of all evidence. If housing market peaks are much like stock market peaks, this is definitely evidence that we are near at least a short-term peak in the housing market.
I’ve been slowly working my way through a book by Richard Zacks called An Underground Education. I’ve found one section that deserves a blog entry of it’s own (I’ll discuss the rest of the book when I’ve finished reading it).
It describes a fairly popular betting-style market that ran from 1771 to 1776 in London about whether a diplomat named Chevalier D’Eon was male or female. D’Eon apparently acted and dressed at times as a man, and at other times as a woman, and refused to help the bettors settle their bets (even when D’Eon was offered a large amount of money to provide evidence of his/her sex). Eventually bettors got tired of waiting for an outcome and resorted to at least one lawsuit. The judge decided that D’Eon was a woman based on testimony from both sides of the lawsuit. Why did the side who had bet D’Eon was a man produce testimony that D’Eon was a woman? It was part of an accusation that the other side traded on what the SEC would call inside information. After D’Eon’s death, mortuary attendants said D’Eon was a man.
Aside from the obvious implications for how idea future style markets need to word claims so as to assure a practical means of observing whether a claim is true or not within a practical time period, this report also says some odd things about gender stereotyping. Lots of people probably think prior generations mostly had Victorian attitudes toward gender confusion, but it seems that D’Eon was sufficiently respectable in 1792 to have a dinner party thrown to honor both Thomas Paine and D’Eon.
Here are a few comments from Friday’s Prediction Markets Summit.
Chris Hibbert described a way that a market with multiple outcomes (such as for supreme court nominees, which list contracts for a number of people, plus one for the rest of the field) could improve liquidity with a modest software change. The system could generate bids and asks for a given contract by aggregating the opposite side of all the other contracts in that market, and generate a synthetic order which would sometimes be within the bid/ask range of regular orders.
Google’s Bo Cowgill reported that one legal problem that Google faces in implementing internal prediction markets is that they might sometimes spread information around the company that might make the people with that information insiders in a way that would complicate those employees’ ability to trade in Google stock. It sounds like the insider trading laws are onerous enough to create a nontrivial barrier to spreading information.
Newsfutures’ Emile Servan-Schreiber said that Newsfutures was supporting the use of internal corporate markets for some fairly big corporate decisions.
Mike Knesevitch of Intrade / Tradesports seems to have lots of experience in traditional financial markets. He said a good deal about the liquidity and accuracy of his exchange’s political markets. The Howard Dean contract went from 33 to 9 within about 5 minutes following Dean’s “implosion” speech. Part of Tradesports’ reluctance to make it’s prices easy to link to is the possibility that they will charge money for those prices much like traditional stock and futures exchanges do. I wish there were a good way for users to persuade new exchanges to commit to keeping information free, but I don’t see a practical way to do that.
HedgeStreet’s Russell Andersson reported that CFTC approval for new contracts was easier than I expected. It takes about 24 hours for contracts dealing with things that the CFTC normally deals with, but weeks to months for other topics. (Why so much variation??)
Microsoft Todd Proebsting is surprisingly enthusiastic about most (all?) of Robin Hanson’s vision of what prediction markets might do. He reported a case where a market did a much better job of predicting when a product would ship than the manager did, although there was some confusion when the market fluctuated when it’s prediction created some uncertainty over whether features would be cut to make the deadline (the contract didn’t adequately specify how it would be judged if the product changed significantly). He reported that there was no resistance to prediction markets from upper management (middle management resisted, since the markets are designed to indicate failings of middle management). He mentioned that laws regulating sweepstakes created some obstacles to implementing internal corporate markets (they’re designed to prevent a sweepstakes game from rewarding the people who control the sweepstakes). He inadvertently(?) promoted the use of open source licenses by mentioning that legal concerns deterred him from looking at Robin’s market scoring Lisp code, which has no license granting any permission to use it.
Eric Zitzewitz responded to Manski’s theoretical criticisms of prediction market accuracy (see his paper on Interpreting Prediction Market Prices as Probabilities), and described some problems with inferring causality from markets and how to structure markets to minimize those problems (see his paper on Five Open Questions About Prediction Markets). He showed an amusing graph indicating that Tradesports prices implied Osama was twice as likely to be captured in October 2004 as in November 2004 (implying some connection with the U.S. elections).
Book Review: The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy, by Kenneth Pomeranz
This book does a good job of criticizing many Anglo-centric explanations of why Europeans industrialized first by providing detailed evidence that the area near the Yangzi river delta was mostly as advanced as England when England started the industrial revolution.
It does a less convincing job of arguing that coal and new world land were the main reasons for England’s success. I’m tempted to believe that American sugar provided desperately needed calories to break out of a Malthusian trap, but the evidence doesn’t show that became significant until the industrial revolution had already started.
Conveniently located coal undoubtedly gave England a boost, but not a big enough boost that there is a practical way to decide it was more important than the numerous cultural differences which might have given England the edge it needed.
The book makes a serious effort to dismiss those cultural explanations, but is not thorough enough. In particular, I’m disappointed with the cryptic way that it dismisses the relevance of the ideas in Helmut Schoeck’s book Envy.
The style is often deadening, with lengthy descriptions of details whose relevance is unobvious.
Several posts on EconLog recently have assumed that human capital will be sufficient for their children to prosper in a Kurzweilian future.
That is a very risky assumption. Human capital has historically been a good investment largely because there have been few innovations that made it easier to produce more humans. Kurzweil’s forecasts imply that around 2040 or 2050 the cost of duplicating a human-equivalent intelligence will plunge. Which means that for most kinds of jobs, the supply of labor should be expected to become nearly unlimited, and in the absence of substantial monopoly, we should expect the price of labor under a Kurzweil scenario to approach zero. Maybe something will guarantee everyone a luxurious lifestyle in a world where there’s little reason for salaries, but I’d rather hedge my bets and accumulate financial assets.
See Robin Hanson’s analysis for a more detailed argument.
The CFTC has reacted to Tradesports‘ futures-like contracts that many U.S. residents have been trading without CFTC regulation.
It is surprising how closely the contracts that they objected to coincide with contracts traded under CFTC regulation – they apparently have prohibited Tradesports from offering to U.S. residents contracts on the results of the next Fed meeting (which Hedgestreet trades under CFTC regulation; Tradesports stopped offering these in May, possibly due to negotiations with the CFTC) but as far as I can tell Tradesports is still able to offer contracts on where the Fed Funds rate will be at the end of the year.
I am also surprised that the CFTC classified the contracts as futures options rather than futures. They do have something resembling as strike price, but otherwise resemble a futures contract more than they resemble an option.
Book Review: Unconventional Success : A Fundamental Approach to Personal Investment by David F. Swensen
This book provides some good advice on how an amateur investor can avoid sub-par results with a modest amount of work. It starts by describing why good asset allocation rules should be the primary concern of the typical person.
I found this quote especially wise: “While hot stocks and brilliant timing make wonderful cocktail party chatter, the conversation-stopping policy portfolio proves far more important to investment success.” Fortunately for those of us who make a living exploiting the mispricing of fad-chasing investors, the most valuable points of this book aren’t in the kind of sound bite that will make them popular at cocktail parties.
But even if you choose investment ideas for cocktail party conversation rather than for building wealth, you should be able to find some value in his explanations of how to avoid being ripped off by fund salesmen and why ETFs are better than most mutual funds.
His attacks on the mutual fund industry are filled with redundant vitriol that may cause some readers to quit in the middle. If you do so, don’t miss table 11.3, which gives an excellent list of ETFs that most investors should use. I was surprised at how much I learned about the differences between good and bad ETFs from this book.
His arguments against investing in foreign bond funds are weak. I suspect he overestimates the degree to which foreign equities diversify exposure to currency risks.
He advises investing more in U.S. equities than in equities of the rest of the world combined, even though his reasoning implies more diversification would be better. But I’ve been slow enough to diversify my own investments this way that I guess I can’t fault him too severely.
He has a plausible claim that not-for-profit organizations that provide investment vehicles on average treat customers more fairly than for-profit funds do, he goes overboard when he claims not-for-profits have no conflict of interest. The desires for job security and large salaries create incentives that would cause many investors to be fleeced if they switched to not-for-profits without becoming more vigilant than they have been.
His faith in the U.S. government is even more naive. He says “U.S. Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities, which provide ironclad assurance against inflation-induced asset erosion”, “Treasury … bondholders face no risk of default”, and “The interests of Treasury bond investors and the U.S. government prove to be better aligned than the interests of corporate bond investors and corporate issuers. The government sees little reason to disfavor bondholders.” But a close look at the CPI shows that indexing to it provides very imperfect inflation protection (e.g. its focus on rents hides the effects of rising home prices), and the current reckless spending policies combined with large foreign holdings of U.S. bonds can hardly avoid creating a motive for future politicians to inflate wildly or default.